September 11th: The Intelligence Angle

Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US

Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladin has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US since 1995. He implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers could follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef to attack America.

After US missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, Bin Ladin told followers he wanted to retaliate in Washington, a service.

An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told American intelligence at the same time that Bin Ladin was planning to exploit access to the US to mount a terrorist strike.

The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been Bin Ladin's first serious attempt to implement an attack on US soil. Convicted plotters Abu Hamza and Mustafa al Umar told FBI agents that they were planning to attack Los Angeles International Airport. Bin Ladin's operation in Egypt encouraged him.


Ressam says Bin Ladin was aware of the United States' plans to attack targets in the US. Although Bin Ladin has not succeeded, he has been careful to advance his operations years in advance and is not deterred.

Associates surveilled US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1993, and some members of the Nairobi cell were arrested and deported in 1997.

Al-Qaeda members—including some who worked for bin Ladin or traveled to the US—have developed support structures that could aid attacks on US targets. As a result, terrorism experts believe that a Bin Ladin cell may already be in place for attacks.

Source: The Washington Post
Introduction

In commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the International Spy Museum has created these lesson plans and activities to support student understanding of the role that intelligence played leading up to, during, and following the events of that day. This pivotal event has greatly changed the world in which today’s students live. Examining 9/11 through the lens of intelligence provides students with a critical perspective on this historic event: the actions taken by the government connected to the attacks and the consequences of those actions.

These lesson plans and activities are designed to assist teachers in integrating new 9/11 content into the curriculum as well as to explore the following concepts: the balance of national security and civil liberties, the role that intelligence plays in informing policy decisions, and domestic legislation stemming from national security threats.

For more educator and student resources, please visit the International Spy Museum website at www.spymuseum.org and click on the Educator Resources tab.
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Lesson Plan 1

The Presidential Daily Brief Deconstructed

Background Briefing

Each morning the President of the United States receives a top-secret document produced by the Director of National Intelligence called the Presidential Daily Brief or PDB. The document is intended to provide the President with new intelligence warranting attention as well as an analysis of sensitive international situations. Production of the PDB is closely linked to that of another publication, historically called the National Intelligence Daily, that contains many of the same items but is distributed considerably more widely than the PDB. There has only been one PDB declassified since the mid 1960’s and this is the August 6th, 2001 PDB—a section of which was declassified as part of The 9/11 Commission Report. This activity, which is based on this declassified section, provides students with a unique opportunity to view the intelligence put before President George W. Bush five weeks prior to the 9/11 attacks.

This activity encourages students to evaluate hypothetical Presidential actions based on existing intelligence. Provocative actions—some of which were taken after the 9/11 attacks, and some of which are illegal—are provided. The goal of this activity is to make students aware that in this case, as in so many cases, insufficient intelligence was available to support definitive actions that would maintain national security.

Objectives

After completing this lesson students will be able to:
- define the function of the Presidential Daily Brief (PDB).
- explain the intelligence cycle.
- discuss various policy decisions that can be made as a result of collected and analyzed intelligence.
- distinguish between the intelligence provided and the policy decisions made by the President.
- describe at least one other historic case in which collected intelligence had an impact on policy decisions.
Activity

1. Distribute to each student for their review:
   a. Declassified excerpt of August 6th PDB (page 15)
   b. The U.S. Intelligence Cycle diagram (page 17)
   c. The 16 U.S. Intelligence Agencies (a/o September, 2011) diagram (page 18)

2. Divide the class into four small groups.

3. After they review the handouts, have each group prepare a Presidential Course of Action Planning Worksheet (pages 07 -14). The courses of action include the following options:
   - Do nothing—wait for more intelligence to come in.
   - Designate a no fly zone in New York City and Washington DC and authorize the U.S. military to shoot down airplanes in those zones.
   - Ground all commercial airlines until more intelligence comes in.
   - Secure all U.S. borders by eliminating the immigration of all Muslims and put all Muslims residing in the U.S. in internment camps.

4. Have each group report out on their course of action using their Presidential Course of Action Planning Worksheet (pages 07 -14).

5. Optional: Distribute for review and discussion:
   a. The National Security Archive article: The Presidential Daily Brief by Thomas Blanton (page 19)
   b. The National Security Archive Excerpts from April 8, 2004 Testimony of Dr. Condoleezza Rice Before the 9/11 Commission Pertaining to The President’s Daily Brief of August 6, 2001 (pages 20-26)
Summative Dialogue

Going through the activity and then examining the U.S. Intelligence Cycle diagram provides students with a better understanding of the role of intelligence gathering and subsequent analysis, and its role in policy-making by the President. It is not the role of the intelligence community to create policy, but to inform the policymakers of the “ground truth,” the collected intelligence and its analysis. Intelligence and its analysis is a “product” that is “consumed” by policymakers. The cycle of intelligence illustrates this process. Note that it is ongoing, as policy makers may require more intelligence collection based on their questions about what has been provided or they may have new questions; and the process begins again. The critical relationship between the intelligence and policymaking entities has changed over time. Into the 1970s, the intelligence community operated in an “ivory tower” producing intelligence reports that were not necessarily useful or wanted by policymakers. Since then the intelligence community has been more directly responsive to policymaker’s need. Most experts agree that a close working relationship between the two is beneficial as long as the policymakers do not in any way influence the analysis of the collected intelligence, meaning, dictate a desired outcome. See the article: Analysis and policy: The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949 by Jack Davis on page 27 for more historical background on this topic.
Presidential Course of Action Planning Worksheet

Group #1

Presidential Course of Action, AUGUST 6, 2001:

Do nothing — wait for more intelligence to come in.

Describe how this course of action would be implemented (list the steps):

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Defend this course of action. In what ways does it protect the American public?

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What are the possible downsides of this course of action (economic, political, etc.)?

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Considering the potential downsides of this action and the available intelligence at this time (August 6, 2001) could the President justify this course of action?

Can you think of a time in history when this course of action or a similar course of action was taken? What was that outcome?
Presidential Course of Action Planning Worksheet

Group #2

Presidential Course of Action, AUGUST 6, 2001:
Designate a no fly zone in New York City and Washington DC and authorize the U.S. military to shoot down airplanes in those zones.

Describe how this course of action would be implemented (list the steps):

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Defend this course of action. In what ways does it protect the American public?

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What are the possible downsides of this course of action (economic, political, etc.)?

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Considering the potential downsides of this action and the available intelligence at this time (August 6, 2001) could the President justify this course of action?

Can you think of a time in history when this course of action or a similar course of action was taken?

What was that outcome?
Presidential Course of Action Planning Worksheet

Group #3

Presidential Course of Action, AUGUST 6, 2001:
Ground all commercial airlines until more intelligence comes in.

Describe how this course of action would be implemented (list the steps):

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Defend this course of action. In what ways does it protect the American public?

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What are the possible downsides of this course of action (economic, political, etc.)?

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Considering the potential downsides of this action and the available intelligence at this time (August 6, 2001) could the President justify this course of action?


Can you think of a time in history when this course of action or a similar course of action was taken?


What was that outcome?
Presidential Course of Action Planning Worksheet

Group #4

Presidential Course of Action, AUGUST 6, 2001:
Secure all U.S. borders by eliminating the immigration of all Muslims and put all Muslims residing in the U.S. in internment camps.

Describe how this course of action would be implemented (list the steps):

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Defend this course of action. In what ways does it protect the American public?

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What are the possible downsides of this course of action (economic, political, etc.)?

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Considering the potential downsides of this action and the available intelligence at this time (August 6, 2001) could the President justify this course of action?

Can you think of a time in history when this course of action or a similar course of action was taken?

What was that outcome?
Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US

Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US. Bin Ladin implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and “bring the fighting to America.”

After US missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, Bin Ladin told followers he wanted to retaliate in Washington, according to a [REDACTED] service.

An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told an [REDACTED] service at the same time that Bin Ladin was planning to exploit the operative’s access to the US to mount a terrorist strike.

The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of Bin Ladin’s first serious attempt to implement a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressam has told the FBI that he conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport himself, but that Bin Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaydah encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation. Ressam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaydah was planning his own US attack.

Ressam says Bin Ladin was aware of the Los Angeles operation.

Although Bin Ladin has not succeeded, his attacks against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrate that he prepares operations years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Ladin associates surveilled our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993, and some members of the Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported in 1997.

Al-Qa’ida members—including some who are US citizens—have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks. Two al-Qa’ida members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb our Embassies in East Africa were US citizens, and a senior EIJ member lived in California in the mid-1990s.

A clandestine source said in 1998 that a Bin Ladin cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks.

We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a [REDACTED] service in 1998 saying that Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of “Blind Shaykh” ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman and other US-held extremists.

continued

For the President Only
6 August 2001

Declassified and Approved for Release, 10 April 2004
Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.

The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the US that it considers Bin Ladin-related. CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our Embassy in the UAE in May saying that a group of Bin Ladin supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives.
Diagram: The U.S. Intelligence Cycle

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

- Analysis
- Processing (decoding, translation, etc.)
- Collecting Info (espionage, imagery, signals, etc.)
- Dissemination to Policymakers
- Questions & Guidance
Diagram: The 16 U.S. Intelligence Agencies
The President’s Daily Brief by Thomas S. Blanton
Updated April 12, 2004

Washington, D.C., 12 April 2004 – President Bush on Saturday, 10 April 2004, became the first sitting president ever to release publicly even a portion of his Daily Brief from the CIA. The page-and-a-half section of the President’s Daily Brief from 6 August 2001, headlined “Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US,” had generated the most contentious questioning in last week’s testimony by national security adviser Condoleezza Rice before the commission investigating the September 11th attacks. Dr. Rice continued to insist that the Brief did not amount to a real warning, while several commissioners seemed to think otherwise.

These contrasting interpretations dominated the weekend’s news. For example, President Bush commented on Sunday that the “PDB said nothing about an attack on America. It talked about intentions, about somebody who hated America – well, we knew that. ... The question was, who was going to attack us, when and where, and with what.” Meanwhile, the Sunday news analysis in The New York Times began with the following summary: “In a single 17-sentence document, the intelligence briefing delivered to President Bush in August 2001 spells out the who, hints at the what and points towards the where of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington that followed 36 days later.”

The American people can decide for themselves about the warning quotient, now that the text of the Brief is public. Even with the text, we don’t really know what the President knew and when he knew it. According to the CIA and the 9/11 commission, there were 40 other mentions of Al Qaeda or Bin Laden in the President’s Daily Briefs before 9/11. Most of those presumably came during what Dr. Rice called “the threat spike” of June and July 2001. The August 6 Brief came on the downside of that spike, so the other PDB reports may be more (or less) alarming. Until these are released – and Saturday’s release shows it can be done with minor deletions to protect sources – neither the American public nor the 9/11 commission can move on to the next question: “What did the President do and when did he do it?” Or, perhaps most important, how do we fix our vulnerabilities, rather than just hide them?

But the release of the Brief raises a number of questions not addressed so far in the press coverage. One is the contrast between the now-released text and what various White House officials said about it over the past two years. A second revolves around renewed claims by the White House and the CIA that this release sets no precedent for release of similar or future information. A third points to the larger question of whether the sustained secrecy around this Brief really made our country more secure, or less so.
Commission member Richard Ben-Veniste

BEN-VENISTE: I want to ask you some questions about the August 6, 2001, PDB. We had been advised in writing by CIA on March 19, 2004, that the August 6th PDB was prepared and self-generated by a CIA employee. Following Director Tenet’s testimony on March 26th before us, the CIA clarified its version of events, saying that questions by the president prompted them to prepare the August 6th PDB. Now, you have said to us in our meeting together earlier in February that the president directed the CIA to prepare the August 6th PDB. The extraordinary high terrorist attack threat level in the summer of 2001 is well-documented. And Richard Clarke’s testimony about the possibility of an attack against the United States homeland was repeatedly discussed from May to August within the intelligence community, and that is well-documented. You acknowledged to us in your interview of February 7, 2004, that Richard Clarke told you that Al Qaida cells were in the United States. Did you tell the president, at any time prior to August 6th, of the existence of Al Qaida cells in the United States?

RICE: First, let me just make certain...

BEN-VENISTE: If you could just answer that question, because I only have a very limited...

RICE: I understand, Commissioner, but it’s important...

BEN-VENISTE: Did you tell the president...

RICE: ... that I also address... (APPLAUSE) It’s also important that, Commissioner, that I address the other issues that you have raised. So I will do it quickly, but if you’ll just give me a moment.

BEN-VENISTE: Well, my only question to you is whether you...

RICE: I understand, Commissioner, but I will...

BEN-VENISTE: ... told the president.

RICE: If you’ll just give me a moment, I will address fully the questions that you’ve asked. First of all, yes, the August 6th PDB was in response to questions of the president -- and that since he asked that this be done. It was not a particular threat report. And there was historical information in there about various aspects of Al Qaida’s operations. Dick Clarke had told me, I think in a memorandum -- I remember it as being only a line or two -- that there were Al Qaida cells in the United States. Now, the question is, what did we need to do about that? And I also understood that that was what the FBI was doing, that the FBI was pursuing these Al Qaida cells. I believe in the August 6th memorandum it says that there were 70 full field investigations under way of these cells. And so there was no recommendation that we do something about this; the FBI was pursuing it. I really don’t remember, Commissioner, whether I discussed this with the president.

BEN-VENISTE: Thank you.

RICE: I remember very well that the president was aware that there were issues inside the United States. He talked to people about this. But I don’t remember the Al Qaida cells as being something that we were told we needed to do something about.
BEN-VENISTE: Isn’t it a fact, Dr. Rice, that the August 6th PDB warned against possible attacks in this country? And I ask you whether you recall the title of that PDB?

RICE: I believe the title was, Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside the United States. Now, the ...

BEN-VENISTE: Thank you.

RICE: No, Mr. Ben-Veniste ...

BEN-VENISTE: I will get into the ...

RICE: I would like to finish my point here.

BEN-VENISTE: I didn’t know there was a point.

RICE: Given that - you asked me whether or not it warned of attacks.

BEN-VENISTE: I asked you what the title was.

RICE: You said, did it not warn of attacks. It did not warn of attacks inside the United States. It was historical information based on old reporting. There was no new threat information. And it did not, in fact, warn of any coming attacks inside the United States.

BEN-VENISTE: Now, you knew by August 2001 of al-Qaida involvement in the first World Trade Center bombing, is that correct? You knew that in 1999, late ’99, in the millennium threat period, that we had thwarted an al-Qaida attempt to blow up Los Angeles International Airport and thwarted cells operating in Brooklyn, New York, and Boston, Massachusetts. As of the August 6th briefing, you learned that al-Qaida members have resided or traveled to the United States for years and maintained a support system in the United States. And you learned that FBI information since the 1998 blind sheik warning of hijackings to free the blind sheik indicated a pattern of suspicious activity in the country up until August 6th consistent with preparation for hijackings. Isn’t that so?

RICE: Do you have other questions that you want me to answer as a part of the sequence?

BEN-VENISTE: Well, did you not -- you have indicated here that this was some historical document. And I am asking you whether it is not the case that you learned in the PDB memo of August 6th that the FBI was saying that it had information suggesting that preparations -- not historically, but ongoing, along with these numerous full field investigations against Al Qaida cells, that preparations were being made consistent with hijackings within the United States?

RICE: What the August 6th PDB said, and perhaps I should read it to you...

BEN-VENISTE: We would be happy to have it declassified in full at this time, including its title. (APPLAUSE)

RICE: I believe, Mr. Ben-Veniste, that you’ve had access to this PDB. But let me just...

BEN-VENISTE: But we have not had it declassified so that it can be shown publicly, as you know.

RICE: I believe you’ve had access to this PDB -- exceptional access. But let me address your question.

BEN-VENISTE: Nor could we, prior to today, reveal the title of that PDB.
RICE: May I address the question, sir? The fact is that this August 6th PDB was in response to the president’s questions about whether or not something might happen or something might be planned by Al Qaida inside the United States. He asked because all of the threat reporting or the threat reporting that was actionable was about the threats abroad, not about the United States. This particular PDB had a long section on what bin Laden had wanted to do -- speculative, much of it -- in ’97, ’98; that he had, in fact, liked the results of the 1993 bombing.

RICE: It had a number of discussions of -- it had a discussion of whether or not they might use hijacking to try and free a prisoner who was being held in the United States -- Ressam. It reported that the FBI had full field investigations under way. And we checked on the issue of whether or not there was something going on with surveillance of buildings, and we were told, I believe, that the issue was the courthouse in which this might take place. Commissioner, this was not a warning. This was a historic memo -- historical memo prepared by the agency because the president was asking questions about what we knew about the inside.

BEN-VENISTE: Well, if you are willing...

RICE: Now, we had already taken...

BEN-VENISTE: If you are willing to declassify that document, then others can make up their minds about it. Let me ask you a general matter, beyond the fact that this memorandum provided information, not speculative, but based on intelligence information, that bin Laden had threatened to attack the United States and specifically Washington, D.C. There was nothing reassuring, was there, in that PDB?

RICE: Certainly not. There was nothing reassuring. But I can also tell you that there was nothing in this memo that suggested that an attack was coming on New York or Washington, D.C. There was nothing in this memo as to time, place, how or where. This was not a threat report to the president or a threat report to me.

BEN-VENISTE: We agree that there were no specifics. Let me move on, if I may.

RICE: There were no specifics, and, in fact, the country had already taken steps through the FAA to warn of potential hijackings. The country had already taken steps through the FBI to task their 56 field offices to increase their activity. The country had taken the steps that it could given that there was no threat reporting about what might happen inside the United States.

BEN-VENISTE: We have explored that and we will continue to with respect to the muscularity and the specifics of those efforts. The president was in Crawford, Texas, at the time he received the PDB, you were not with him, correct?

RICE: That is correct.

BEN-VENISTE: Now, was the president, in words or substance, alarmed or in any way motivated to take any action, such as meeting with the director of the FBI, meeting with the attorney general, as a result of receiving the information contained in the PDB?

RICE: I want to repeat that when this document was presented, it was presented as, yes, there were some frightening things -- and by the way, I was not at Crawford, but the president and I were in contact and I might have even been, though I can’t remember, with him by video link during that time. The president was told this is historical information. I’m told he was told this is historical information and there was nothing actionable in this. The president knew that the FBI was pursuing this issue. The president knew that the director of central intelligence was pursuing this issue. And there was no new threat information in this document to pursue.
Commission member Robert Kerrey

KERREY: Actually it won’t be a question. In the spirit of further declassification, this is what the August 6th memo said to the president: that the FBI indicates patterns of suspicious activity in the United States consistent with preparations for hijacking. That’s the language of the memo that was briefed to the president on the 6th of August.

RICE: And that was checked out and steps were taken through FAA circulars to warn of hijackings. But when you cannot tell people where a hijacking might occur, under what circumstances -- I can tell you that I think the best antidote to what happened in that regard would have been many years before to think about what you could do for instance to harden cockpits. That would have made a difference. We weren’t going to harden cockpits in the three months that we had a threat spike. The really difficult thing for all of us, and I’m sure for those who came before us as well as for those of us who are here, is that the structural and systematic changes that needed to be made -- not on July 5th or not on June 25th or not on January 1st -- those structures and those changes needed to be made a long time ago so that the country was in fact hardened against the kind of threat that we faced on September 11th. The problem was that for a country that had not been attacked on its territory in a major way in almost 200 years, there were a lot of structural impediments to those kinds of attacks.

RICE: Those changes should have been made over a long period of time. I fully agree with you that, in hindsight, now looking back, there are many things structurally that were out of kilter. And one reason that we’re here is to look at what was out of kilter structurally, to look at needed to be done, to look at what we already have done, and to see what more we need to do. But I think it is really quite unfair to suggest that something that was a threat spike in June or July gave you the kind of opportunity to make the changes in air security that could have been -- that needed to be made.

Commission member Timothy Roemer

ROEMER: Let me ask you a question. You just said that the intelligence coming in indicated a big, big, big threat. Something was going to happen very soon and be potentially catastrophic. I don’t understand, given the big threat, why the big principals don’t get together. The principals meet 33 times in seven months, on Iraq, on the Middle East, on missile defense, China, on Russia. Not once do the principals ever sit down -- you, in your job description as the national security advisor, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, the president of the United States -- and meet solely on terrorism to discuss in the spring and the summer, when these threats are coming in, when you’ve known since the transition that Al Qaida cells are in the United States, when, as the PDB said on August, bin Laden determined to attack the United States. Why don’t the principals at that point say, Let’s all talk about this, let’s get the biggest people together in our government and discuss what this threat is and try to get our bureaucracies responding to it?

RICE: Once again, on the August 6th memorandum to the president, this was not threat-reporting about what was about to happen. This was an analytic piece that stood back and answered questions from the president. But as to the principals meetings...

ROEMER: It has six or seven things in it, Dr. Rice, including the Ressam case when he attacked the United States in the millennium.

RICE: Yes, these are his...

ROEMER: Has the FBI saying that they think that there are conditions.
Article: National Security Archive, continued

Excerpts from April 8, 2004 Testimony of Dr. Condoleezza Rice Before the 9/11 Commission Pertaining to The President’s Daily Brief of August 6, 2001

RICE: No, it does not have the FBI saying that they think that there are conditions. It has the FBI saying that they observed some suspicious activity. That was checked out with the FBI.

ROEMER: That is equal to what might be...

RICE: No.

ROEMER: ... conditions for an attack.

RICE: Mr. Roemer, Mr. Roemer, threat reporting...

ROEMER: Would you say, Dr. Rice, that we should make that PDB a public document...

RICE: Mr. Roemer...

ROEMER: ... so we can have this conversation? RICE: Mr. Roemer, threat reporting is: We believe that something is going to happen here and at this time, under these circumstances. This was not threat reporting.

ROEMER: Well, actionable intelligence, Dr. Rice, is when you have the place, time and date. The threat reporting saying the United States is going to be attacked should trigger the principals getting together to say we’re going to do something about this, I would think.

RICE: Mr. Roemer, let’s be very clear. The PDB does not say the United States is going to be attacked. It says bin Laden would like to attack the United States. I don’t think you, frankly, had to have that report to know that bin Laden would like to attack the United States.

ROEMER: So why aren’t you doing something about that earlier than August 6th? (APPLAUSE) RICE: The threat reporting to which we could respond was in June and July about threats abroad. What we tried to do for -- just because people said you cannot rule out an attack on the United States, was to have the domestic agencies and the FBI together to just pulse them and have them be on alert.

ROEMER: I agree with that.

RICE: But there was nothing that suggested there was going to be a threat...

ROEMER: I agree with that.

RICE: ... to the United States.

ROEMER: I agree with that. So, Dr. Rice, let’s say that the FBI is the key here. You say that the FBI was tasked with trying to find out what the domestic threat was. We have done thousands of interviews here at the 9/11 Commission. We’ve gone through literally millions of pieces of paper. To date, we have found nobody -- nobody at the FBI who knows anything about a tasking of field offices. We have talked to the director at the time of the FBI during this threat period, Mr. Pickard. He says he did not tell the field offices to do this. And we have talked to the special agents in charge. They don’t have any recollection of receiving a notice of threat. Nothing went down the chain to the FBI field offices on spiking of information, on knowledge of Al Qaida in the country, and still, the FBI doesn’t do anything. Isn’t that some of the responsibility of the national security advisor?
Excerpts from April 8, 2004 Testimony of Dr. Condoleezza Rice Before the 9/11 Commission Pertaining to The President’s Daily Brief of August 6, 2001

RICE: The responsibility for the FBI to do what it was asked was the FBI’s responsibility. Now, I...

ROEMER: You don’t think there’s any responsibility back to the advisor to the president... RICE: I believe that the responsibility -- again, the crisis management here was done by the CSG. They tasked these things. If there was any reason to believe that I needed to do something or that Andy Card needed to do something, I would have been expected to be asked to do it. We were not asked to do it. In fact, as I’ve...

ROEMER: But don’t you ask somebody to do it? You’re not asking somebody to do it. Why wouldn’t you initiate that?

RICE: Mr. Roemer, I was responding to the threat spike and to where the information was. The information was about what might happen in the Persian Gulf, what might happen in Israel, what might happen in North Africa. We responded to that, and we responded vigorously. Now, the structure...

ROEMER: Dr. Rice, let me ask you...

RICE: ... of the FBI, you will get into next week.

ROEMER: You’ve been helpful to us on that -- on your recommendation.

KEAN: Last question, Congressman.

ROEMER: Last question, Dr. Rice, talking about responses. Mr. Clarke writes you a memo on September the 4th, where he lays out his frustration that the military is not doing enough, that the CIA is not pushing as hard enough in their agency. And he says we should not wait until the day that hundreds of Americans lay dead in the streets due to a terrorist attack and we think there could have been something more we could do.

ROEMER: Seven days prior to September the 11th, he writes this to you. What’s your reaction to that at the time, and what’s your response to that at the time?

RICE: Just one final point I didn’t quite complete. I, of course, did understand that the attorney general needed to know what was going on, and I asked that he take the briefing and then ask that he be briefed. Because, again, there was nothing demonstrating or showing that something was coming in the United States. If there had been something, we would have acted on it.

ROEMER: I think we should make this document public, Dr. Rice. Would you support making the August 6th PDB public?

RICE: The August 6th PDB has been available to you. You are describing it. And the August 6th PDB was a response to questions asked by the president, not a warning document.

ROEMER: Why wouldn’t it be made public then?

RICE: Now, as to -- I think you know the sensitivity of presidential decision memoranda. And I think you know the great lengths to which we have gone to make it possible for this commission to view documents that are not generally -- I don’t know if they’ve ever been -- made available in quite this way. Now, as to what Dick Clarke said on September 4th, that was not a premonition, nor a warning. What that memorandum was, as I was getting ready to go into the September 4th principals meeting to review the NSPD and to approve the new NSPD, what it was a warning to me that the bureaucracies would try to undermine it. Dick goes into great and emotional detail about the long history of how DOD has never been responsive,
about how the Predator has gotten hung up because the CIA doesn’t really want to fly it. And he says, if you don’t fight through this bureaucracy -- he says, at one point, They’re going to all sign on to this NSPD because they won’t want to be associated -- they won’t want to say they don’t want to eliminate the threat of Al Qaida. He says, But, in effect, you have to go in there and push them, because we’ll all wonder about the day when thousands of Americans and so forth and so on.

So that’s what this document is. It’s not a warning document. It’s not a -- all of us had this fear. I think that the chairman mentioned that I said this in an interview, that we would hope not to get to that day. But it would not be appropriate or correct to characterize what Dick wrote to me on September 4th as a warning of an impending attack. What he was doing was, I think, trying to buck me up, so that when I went into this principals meeting, I was sufficiently on guard against the kind of bureaucratic inertia that he had fought all of his life.

ROEMER: What is a warning, if August 6th isn’t and September 4th isn’t, to you?

RICE: Well, August 6th is most certainly an historical document that says, Here’s how you might think about Al Qaida. A warning is when you have something that suggests that an attack is impending. And we did not have, on the United States, threat information that was, in any way, specific enough to suggest that something was coming in the United States. The September 4th memo, as I’ve said to you, was a warning to me not to get dragged down by the bureaucracy, not a warning about September 11th.
The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949

Jack Davis

Sherman Kent’s *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, published in 1949, is probably the most influential book ever written on US intelligence analysis. Indeed, Kent’s carefully drafted blueprint for meeting the challenges facing intelligence in the postwar world has regularly been cited by defenders and critics alike of the performance of the Central Intelligence Agency. Almost all experienced Agency analysts are generally familiar with Kent’s themes, though probably more from informal discussions than from a careful reading.

One of Kent’s most finely honed doctrines addresses the relationship between producers and consumers of intelligence analysis. Effective ties, while manifestly essential for the well-being of both groups, were difficult to achieve. Kent’s recommended fix: to warrant scholarly objectivity, provide analysts with institutional independence; to warrant relevance, urge them to strive to obtain “guidance” from policymakers.

William Kendall’s “The Function of Intelligence,” a 1949 review of *Strategic Intelligence*, agreed with Kent on the importance of getting right the relationship between experts and decisionmakers but on little else. Kendall’s bold and prescient arguments deserve more attention from both students and practitioners of intelligence analysis.

Kendall rejected what he depicted as Kent’s ideal of bureaucratic scholars processing information to understand the outside world for the benefit of bureaucratic policy planners. The function of the intelligence as Kendall saw it was directly to help “politically responsible” leaders achieve their foreign policy goals in large measure by identifying the elements of an issue that were susceptible to US influence. In addition, Kendall observed that if the intelligence mission were to illuminate decisionmaking with the best expert knowledge can provide, Kent’s aversions to taking account of domestic US politics and social science theory were self-defeating.

This article first sets out the major lines of doctrinal disagreement between Kent and Kendall in the context of the late 1940’s. It then sketches the impact of the opposing views on CIA doctrine and practice during the ensuing 40 years. Finally, it addresses requirements for effective producer-consumer relations in the 1990s, a period in which challenges to both policymakers and analysts are likely to increase even as resources committed to national security become scarcer. If for no other reason, doctrinal choices require thoughtful examination at this juncture.

Kent’s Perspective

Kent, born in 1903 into a politically prominent California family, spent some 20 years before World War II at Yale University, as undergraduate and graduate student and as a faculty member. His major interests were the teaching of European history and the study of 19th-century French politics. His world and political views then and subsequently would characterize him as an eastern establishment liberal. A colorful one though, as indicated by the many references to his earthy vocabulary and humor.

Kent was a 37-year-old assistant professor at Yale in 1941 when he answered the call to scholars for enlistment in the national defense. He joined the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) in what started as the Office of the Coordinator of Information and was transformed in 1942 into the Office of Strategic Services. R&A was quickly dubbed the “Four-Eyes Brigade,” whose most powerful weapon was the index card. At war’s end though, Kent described it as an institution “of almost bewildering power, resourcefulness, and flexibility.”

Kent was proud as well of his own wartime achievements, especially the Herculean research effort in support of planning for the 1942 Allied invasion of North Africa. He won recognition for his bureaucratic as well as his research skills, especially his ability to manage often reluctant fellow scholars to work as teams and to meet deadlines as well as standards. For the North African exercise, his unit worked around the clock for several days and
impressed the military consumers with the wealth of useful information uncovered from R&A’s perch in the Library of Congress.

For his efforts, Kent was recognized as the senior R&A division chief when, upon the abolition of OSS in 1945, the 1,500-strong research unit was moved to the State Department. He rose quickly to deputy and then acting director of the newly created Office of Research and Intelligence. No pride here; rather, dismay. His two bosses quit in response to State’s gutting of R&A. Kent himself resigned in mid-1946. He was unable to accept the scattering of the research cadre to the various geographic policy bureaus, who went to work directly under the command of the assistant secretaries.  

Kent arranged for an extension of his leave of absence from Yale, in order not to cut loose either from the Washington scene or from his concerns about the future of “strategic intelligence.” First, he spent a semester teaching at the newly formed National War College. Then, with the funds from a Guggenheim Fellowship and in an office at the War College, he proceeded to draft the book that, as he put it, “wild horses” could not keep him from turning out. If he had a priority goal, it was to preserve what he saw as the rapidly fraying bonds between first-rate scholarships and national defense.  

Kent relied mostly on his experience as historian and analyst, though he also read through the “infantile” student essays on intelligence at the War College library and conducted bull sessions and exchanges of letters with an impressive array of R&A, Yale University, and the War College colleagues. His third and final draft was completed late in 1947, at which time he did return to teaching history at Yale.  

In 1950, in the wake of Korean War emergency, Director of Central Intelligence Agency Gen. Waiter Bedell Smith in effect drafted Kent back into intelligence service. Kent was named deputy and heir apparent to his old R&A boss William Langer for the new Office of National Estimates (ONE). Kent was recognized as one of the leading US authorities on intelligence research. Indeed, General Smith’s deputy, William Jackson, had lobbied to have him named to the top ONE post. Kent served as head of ONE from 1952 until his retirement from the agency in 1967. As with his R&A experience, he impressed his colleagues with a talent for leadership as well as scholarship.  

Kent’s Doctrine: 1949  
One reason for the continued attention by academic specialists on intelligence to a book now over 40 years old is that little else of Kent’s thoughts on the subject is readily available. Kent made a point of not talking or writing publicly about the “business,” even after retirement. Those, including myself, who served under Kent and have access to others who worked with him during his 17 years with CIA have a handicap of their own. They have to take care to distinguish between the Kent of the book and the practicing Kent.  

In the final chapter of Strategic Intelligence, Kent characterized the relationship between “producers and consumers of intelligence” as “one of utmost delicacy.” The relationship did not establish itself but required “a great deal of conscious effort, and is likely to disappear when that effort is relaxed.” What could be counted on to work at the desk level became more problematic at higher levels. Indeed, the more “august” the issue, the less one could rely on effective ties.  

Kent provided several reasons, the most prominent being the fact that policy makers do not naturally trust the quality and utility of the product of intelligence makers, nor the latters’ readiness to take responsibility for their assessments. Kent quipped, “I will warrant that the Light Brigade’s G-2 was high on the list of survivors in the charge at Balaclava.” What to do about it? Kent’s recommendations are colored by his view of the mission of strategic intelligence as well as “by his concern that the relationship required special handling. Kent believed that the function of the intelligence unit was to provide expert knowledge of the external world, on the basis of which sound policy would then be made by those with expert knowledge of US politics. While the intelligence unit “wished above all else to have its findings prove useful in the makings of decisions,” its role had clear limits.  

Intelligence is not the formulator of objectives ... drafter of policy ... maker of plans ... carrier out of operations. Intelligence is ancillary to these; ... it performs a service function. Its job is to see that the doers are generally well informed ... to stand behind them with the book open at the right page, to call their attention to the stubborn fact they may be neglecting, and-at their request-to analyze alternative courses without indicating choice.
According to Kent, policymakers are very much in need of the intelligence unit’s service, which at one point he defines as knowledge about foreign countries that is “complete ... accurate ... delivered on time and . . . capable of serving as a basis for action.” To be worthwhile, though, intelligence has to provide objective scholarship. Getting too close to policy would undercut the whole purpose of such an effort. In this context, policy did “not necessarily mean officially accepted high United States policy.”

... but something far less exalted. What I am talking of is often expressed by the words “slant,” “line,” “position,” and “view.”

Kent made much of the point that analysts had enough difficulty avoiding unsound judgements on tough issues without worrying about what conclusions a policymaking boss wanted to see in their intelligence assessments.

Other difficulties that would emerge if intelligence analysts worked directly for policy officials could be fixed at least in part by good administration: the tendency of operational bosses to put analysts to work as operators, to preoccupy them with trivial questions that precluded serious research, to permit research standards and coordination across regional desks to suffer. But in Kent’s considered judgement the problem of the skewing of analysis to fit the wishes and fears of the bosses had no solution.

Kent was well aware of the need for analysts to put something on the table for policymakers in addition to scholarship. Analysts, he averred, were not paid to pursue knowledge for its own sake but rather for “the practical matter of taking action.” He went one step further: intelligence that is ignored, for whatever reason, is “useless.” To avoid this, analysts have to bend every effort to obtain guidance from their customers. Today this is called tasking and feedback.

Intelligence cannot serve if it does not know the doer’s mind; it cannot serve if it has not his confidence; it cannot serve unless it can have the kind of guidance any professional man must have from his client.

Kent put the challenge of getting the relationship right into a well-known phrase: “Intelligence must be close enough to policy, plans, and operations to have the greatest amount of guidance, and must not be so close that it loses its objectivity and integrity of judgement.” He conceded that the danger to the relationship of intelligence being too far from policy was greater than that of being too close. But he could not leave matters there, warning instead that “the absorption of intelligence producers by intelligence consumers may prove too heroic a cure for both disease and patient.” Thus, Kent recommended what he called the customary compromise, in effect the “bargain” of his book:

Guarantee intelligence its administrative and substantive integrity by keeping it separate from its consumers; keep trying every known device to make the users familiar with the producers’ organization, and the producers with the users’ organization.

He ended chapter and book with still another expression of concern about the “delicacy” of the relationship between men of study and men of action. He warned policymakers that, if they ignored the intelligence arm when its considered judgements disagreed with their “intuition,” they would be turning their back “on the two instruments by which Western man has since Aristotle steadily enlarged his horizon of knowledge—the instruments of reason and the scientific method.”

Kendall’s Perspective

Kendall’s perspective on intelligence and policy is much more difficult to capture within the confines of a short paper than is Kent’s. Kendall seems by far the more complex man. Unlike Kent, he left little or no commentary on his doctrine of intelligence; and some of his recommendations require understanding of his philosophical positions on broader matters of politics, government, and the Constitution.

Born in Oklahoma in 1909, Kendall was a child prodigy, who at the age of four began reading adult material to his father, a blind, circuit-riding Methodist minister. Kendall’s education and world view had more varied stations than did Kent’s. Kendall attended the Universities of Tulsa, Oklahoma, Northwestern, Illinois, and Oxford (as a Rhodes Scholar). After completing all course work for a doctorate in Romance languages, he switched interests and obtained his degree in political philosophy. In the mid-1930’s, his ideology was leftist, perhaps even Trotskyite. In the 1940’s, he became a staunchly anti-Communist conservative. At the time of his death in 1967, he was considered to have been a major (to some, the
major) contributor to the postwar development of American conservative political philosophy. In 1942, Kendall was an assistant professor of political science at the University of Richmond when he made the move to Washington to join the war effort. Most of his wartime posts appear to have been as an operational official rather than as an intelligence analyst. He served, for example, in Washington and in Bogota, Columbia, with the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American affairs, which was engaged in propaganda and psychological warfare. This wartime creation was independent of OSS, but was moved to State’s Office of Research and Intelligence in 1945 along with R&A.

Kendall’s hands-on experience with intelligence analysis apparently was limited to a year or so. For some months in 1946, he was chief of Latin American research in State’s troubled intelligence office. In August 1946, Kendall moved to the newly created Office of Research and Evaluation (soon renamed Reports and Estimates) of the Central Intelligence Group (shortly thereafter, CIA). He served there as chief of the Latin American Branch, one of several large units of that office. By the fall of 1947, he had joined the Political Science Department of Yale University as associate professor, the same time that Kent had rejoined the History Department as full professor.

Little information is available on Kendall’s brief experience in intelligence analysis. Two who served with him during his CIA tour remember him as contemptuous of his fellow branch chiefs and of his staff; ready to lecture those few he deemed capable of learning about political philosophy, effective argumentation, and the intelligence mission; and equally combative about bureaucratic perquisites and substantive judgments. He was not a particularly good “listener.” And he was seen regularly as an obstacle to “getting the job done.” If one reads backward from his subsequent endeavors-at Yale from 1947 to 1961 and as a senior editor of the National Review from 1955 to 1963-one also concludes that the promotion of teamwork and other bureaucratic values was not his strong suit. Yale administrators saw him as a disruptive force and were happy to purchase his tenure rights to have him off their campus. The story at National Review: Kendall was never on speaking terms with more than one fellow staffer at a time. One observer of his operating style in conservative intellectual circles claimed Kendall was without peer in his speed for turning a discussion into a shouting match.

“Controversial,” “isolated,” a natural “aginner” are all characterizations Kendall would probably have proudly accepted. A memorial collection of his essays in fact was entitled Willmoore Kendall Contra Mundum. His brilliance, according to one observer was “his capability to think his way through convention and assumption finally to arrive at the irreducible and crystalline truth.”

Back to the I 940s. The future of American intelligence was a frequently discussed topic in the nation’s capital. And whatever the extent of Kendall’s direct experience, his “intellectual charisma,” according to one observer, warranted an audience for his views in various circles. Kendall continued working in Washington for the government part-time after he took his appointment at Yale, once again on psychological warfare. But after his 1949 essay, he left little evidence of a continued interest in intelligence analysis.

**Kendall’s Doctrine**

Kendall’s review of Strategic Intelligence praised Kent for his talent in describing the terminology and organizational map of intelligence. But he criticized Kent’s recommendations for improving the performance of intelligence as well as of his underlying “general theory” of intelligence.

Apparently, Kendall was at least as alarmed as Kent over the postwar shortfalls of American intelligence, and he was much less willing to accept existing (“official Washington”) compromises based on experience and expediency. He wished Kent would have carried his guarded criticisms about the declining quality of personnel, the misdirection of clandestine collection, the excessive concern with security to their logical ends, so that the reader might see the “intelligence arrangements ... [Kent] would set up if all the resistances were removed.”

As the book was written, Kendall concluded that: ... if all of Mr. Kent’s reproofs were acted upon, and all his proposals adopted, the result would be an improvement in United States intelligence operations. But the improvement would, like the infant mentioned in Marx’s famous footnote, be very small.
Kendall charged Kent with a misguided view of the function of intelligence, in the first instance because of a preoccupation with an “essentially wartime conception” of the analysts’ role. Excessive concentration on building knowledge about current and potential enemy countries diverts attention from support for “the big job—the carving out of United States destiny in the world as a whole.”

Kendall also criticized Kent (and through him prevailing practice) for a “crassly empirical conception of the research process,” one favored by historians. Kendall calls instead for:

... an intelligence operation built upon a conception of the research process in the social sciences that assigns due weight to “theory” as it is understood in economics and sociology and, increasingly one hopes, in politics ...

Throwing in as well the charge of an excessively bureaucratic concept of how the US Government should work, Kendall would free intelligence officers from “the tidal wave of documents” Kent would have them process. Kendall would recruit a “considerable percentage” of the intelligence unit “precisely for its theoretical training and accomplishments ... and enable them to work under conditions calculated to encourage thought” (emphasis in the original). He would supply the analysts, via telephone to the field, with “the data that really matter;” information on currently developing situations, rather than with “out-of-date” traffic and documents.

Kendall’s major salvos against Kent concern “the relation of intelligence to policy in a democratic society,” a matter of vital importance “since it is American policy on which the future of the free world seems to depend.” He agreed with Kent on the need for “guidance” from policymakers to get the intelligence job done, and on the absence of such guidance “as regards the great decisions about foreign policy.” He chides Kent for not facing up to the danger to the nation from such an alarming state of affairs.

More specifically, Kendall charges Kent (and the reigning leaders of intelligence) with a “compulsive preoccupation with prediction” (emphasis in the original), with elimination of ‘surprise’ from foreign affairs.”

The shadow of Pearl Harbor is projected into the mists of Bogota, and intelligence looks shamefaced over its failure to tell Secretary [of State] Marshall the day and hour at which a revolution will break out in Colombia. The course of events is conceived not as something you try to influence but as a tape all printed up inside a machine; and the job of intelligence is to tell the planners how it reads.

Kendall sees the intelligence function as helping the policymakers “influence” the course of events by helping them understand the operative factors on which the US can have an impact. His most specific language appears in a footnote which starts with examples of “absolute” (and thus inappropriate) predictions: “General DeGaulle will come to power this day six months’; or ‘Japan will attack Pearl Harbor on the x-day at y-hour.’ ” His example of a “contingent” or appropriate prediction:

“The following factors, which can be influenced in such and such a fashion by action from outside, will determine whether, and if so, when, General DeGaulle will come to power.”

Kendall had two additional criticisms of what he considered Kent’s flawed theory of producer-consumer relations. He sees Kent’s endorsement of the traditional separations of intelligence from domestic affairs as self-defeating, if the goal of the intelligence unit is to bring to bear the knowledge on which foreign policy decisions are to be made. According to Kendall, Kent’s definition of mission:

... puts [foreign affairs] in the hands of a distinct group of officials whose “research” must stop short at the 3-mile limit even when the thread they are following runs right across it, and yet which tells itself it is using the scientific method. (This ends up with intelligence reports that never, never take cognizance of United States policies alternative to the ones actual in effect, such problems being “domestic matters.”)

Finally, he charged that Kent, yet again endorsing current practices, would have the intelligence unit laboring for a mid- rather than top-level audience. Kendall rejected the intelligence function as research assistant to bureaucratic “policy planners,” such as George Kennan at the State Department.
The issue here is fundamental: if you conceive the intelligence function [as Kent does], you are excluding from its purview what this writer would call its most crucial aspect—i.e., that which concerns the communications to the politically responsible laymen of the knowledge which, to use Mr. [Walter] Lippmann's happy phrase, determines the “pictures” they have in their heads of the world to which their decisions relate.21

Was There a Debate?

I have found insufficient evidence to conclude that a Kent-Kendall debate took place in the late 1940—some kind of doctrinal shootout between champions of the detached and close-support approaches to the producer-consumer relationship. The two did exchange views at least from time to time in Washington and in New Haven. In the preface to the 1949 edition of *Strategic Intelligence*, Kent thanks Kendall and three others “for readings of the manuscript and many kinds of advice.” The same preface, though, also expresses obligations to some 30 additional “friends, associates, and disputants.”22 Apparently, Kent did not think Kendall’s doctrinal rebuke worth taking into account either in his final draft for the book or in his subsequent writings on intelligence.23

Whether or not the two debated much with each other, the future of American intelligence was a matter for frequent discussion in informed and influential circles during the early postwar years. First, a Central Intelligence Agency was proposed, opposed, blessed, and staffed. In addition to White House plans and disposition, Congressional hearings, and continuous conflict among bureaucrats representing various intelligence organizations, discussion was fueled by several major investigations of intelligence organization and performance (the so-called Eberstadt, Lovett, and Dulles-Jackson-Correa reports).

Most of the controversy, though, concerned what kind of central intelligence entity to construct and its relations with departmental intelligence organizations. The investigations, the recently declassified official CIA histories of the period, and—excepting Kendall—the reviews of *Strategic Intelligence* spend little or no time on policy relations per se.24 The latter issue was not entirely ignored.25 Kent’s deliberate argument in *Strategic Intelligence* took aim at those in the State Department and presumably elsewhere in Washington who saw no great value in an independent intelligence unit. His doctrinal standards (administrative independence and scholarly objectivity balanced by vigorous pursuit of guidance), if not the “official Washington” view as Kendall charged, probably seemed in the ball park to most discussants. Indeed, supporters of a strong central intelligence entity had a motive to play down, at least in public discussion, the influence of intelligence on policy: to ward off critics’ charges that such an organization would become too powerful and thereby threaten American democracy.

What of Kendall’s doctrines? Some discussants, as indicated, probably thought the views espoused by Kent went too far in attempting to insulate intelligence practitioners from their policy counterparts. But did many stand with Kendall? In other words, did he too represent a major party to the debate, a large or at least respected faction? Or, as so often in his later career, was Kendall all but outside the contemporary lines of argument, a compulsive critic of conventional wisdom striving to have others see the issue as he saw it in his mind’s eye? I believe the latter was the case.

After all, Kendall was calling for intelligence professionals to step over their own shadow—in terms of writing directly to the perspective of elected officials, taking account of domestic politics as well as policy prerogatives, and shedding such traditional preoccupations as staying on top of the traffic and investing in empirical research on potential enemy countries. At least some contemporary observers, probably including Kent, thought Kendall’s juggling of the intelligence and policy roles to be “irresponsible.”26

Kendall’s apparent recommendation that the intelligence unit serve the policymaking needs of congressional leaders is one indication of how far his views were from the mainstream in 1949. Kendall was an antagonist of the “imperial presidency” and an advocate instead of rule by “politically responsible laymen” in Congress.

Judging by the hard edge of mutual criticism, Kent and Kendall probably saw little that was complementary in their concepts about the function of intelligence; that is a belief that the national
interest would benefit from both a detached and a close-support service, performed at different levels of the intelligence unit or under differing circumstances. This might make sense today, but in the context of 1949 the two seemed to be describing two separate functions. Kent’s intelligence unit was to focus on “rolling back the inventory of ignorance” about an uncertain postwar world, so that policy units would be effectively served when the need arose. His goal was to have the nation’s best scholars make a career of being intelligence professionals, much the way in preceding generations they made their careers as part of the professoriate.

Kendall, in contrast, was indelibly antibureaucratic concerning both government and university. He did not believe “guidance” would come from policymakers, unless analysts put more on the table than Kent would have them commit. Thus, Kendall’s intelligence unit was focused as much on operational “solutions” as on problems overseas. His description of the intelligence function-wise men who are part of the political and policymaking processes-sounds much like the role played in the 1940s by the “policy planners” he scorned. Perhaps even closer models to much of what Kendall had in mind are the regional and functional directors of the National Security Council staff as that institution developed in subsequent decades.

Four Decades of Doctrine and Practice

In my view, which is marked by years of labor within an “intelligence unit,” the untidiness of practice is seen regularly to obscure the clarity of doctrines on producer-consumer relations. Leadership’s attempts to set a standard by pronouncement, incentive, and example routinely evoke working-level pleadings on why said standard could not work on this subject, at this time, with this analyst, for this consumer. The history of producer-consumer relations demands and is worthy of book-length treatment, to determine what actually has worked, what has not, and why. Here only one point is developed: If on nothing else, Kent cannot be faulted for saying “a great deal of conscious effort” is required to extract the full potential of the producer-consumer relationship.

Over the years, diversity in practice on the part of CIA analytic units has been propelled by a parade of diverse personalities, opportunities, and obstacles. Thus, any attempt to characterize a decade is immediately put at risk to a large number of exceptions. That said, one can make the case that Kent’s doctrine as projected in Strategic Intelligence had considerable currency in practice during the 1950s.

First, President Eisenhower’s administrative style for national security issues-regularly planned NSC meetings to discuss if not to decide policy-provided an orderly place for the scholarship of intelligence.

Because National Intelligence Estimates were regularly included or taken account of in briefing books for meetings over which the President was to preside, policymaking officials had a stake in being informed on, and in trying to inform intelligence judgments. Second, both the intelligence and policy communities were staffed at high levels by people who regularly sought and gave “guidance.” The close ties between DCI and Secretary of State-first Generals Smith and Marshall and the brothers Dulles-are well known. But there were other valuable connections. For example, during part of the decade, CIA’s Deputy Director for Intelligence and State’s director of the Policy Planning Staff, who were former colleagues as Harvard law students, drove to and from work together.

During the 1960s, ready made opportunities for guidance were reduced, as President Kennedy’s more ad hoc operating style frequently left the intelligence analysts a day late and a dollar short. Ray Cline, who served with ONE during the 1950s and as CIA’s Deputy Director for Intelligence during the 1960s, used a sports metaphor to contrast the periods. Under Eisenhower, the making of policy was like a football game, with a play for intelligence analysts called in each huddle. Under Kennedy, it was like a basketball game with the players in constant motion. The tendency to bypass intelligence judgments accelerated sharply in the 1970s, as a result of the antagonisms toward CIA analysis on the part of President Nixon and National Security Adviser Kissinger. Even when Kissinger became Secretary of State, his low regard for analysts continued to extend to State Department intelligence as well as CIA.

Removal of CIA quarters, in the early 1960s, from a central location in the District of Columbia to a much less accessible location in suburban Virginia added psychological as well as social distance between intelligence and policy professionals. As the analytic cadre at CIA became more substantively specialized, careerist, and
bureaucratic during the 1960s and 1970s, it also became more introverted and self-satisfied. Thus, as a rule the absence of guidance was not viewed as an insuperable obstacle by analysts, who thought that the quality and integrity of their assessments would be sufficient to command the attention of the policy community.

Kent himself during the latter years of his service (until 1967) and in his lectures on intelligence in the ensuing decade seemed to place heavier emphasis on independence of judgment and less on seeking guidance. Some of his statements indicate a fear that extensive contact with policy officials, even with institutional independence, could corrupt the analytic process. He warned one colleague that “analysts and estimators who go downtown will become policy advocates and begin to serve power rather than truth.”

Kent was resisted by other Agency leaders and by members of his ONE staff in his retreat from his own prior insistence on the importance of guidance. This was undertaken apparently without direct knowledge of Kendall’s views. The Ray Cline story was part of his effort to increase emphasis on intelligence memorandums at the exposure of Kent’s National Intelligence Estimates, on the grounds that the former would more effectively meet the consumers’ needs. Chester Cooper, Cline’s appointment to the new position of Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence for Policy Support, also tried to wrest the doctrinal banner from Kent by emphasizing the importance of staying in close touch with the policy world. And a number of analytic units and individual analysts, largely innocent of the doctrinal dispute, went about their business trying to maximize their service to consumers of intelligence by seeking tasking and feedback.

I believe, though, that most CIA analysts and managers during the 1960s and 1970s identified with Kent’s fear of corruption of objectivity and his aversion to close ties to policy officials. Kent’s final published words on the delicate relationship speak loudly of independence and say nothing of seeking guidance.

I suppose that if we in intelligence were one day given three wishes, they would be to know everything, to be believed when we spoke, and in such a way to exercise an influence to the good in the matter of policy. But absent the Good Fairy, we sometimes get the order of our unarticulated wishes mixed. Often we feel the desire to influence policy and perhaps just stop wishing here. This is too bad, because to wish simply for influence can, and upon occasion does, get intelligence to the place where it can have no influence whatever. By striving too hard in this direction intelligence may come to seem just another policy voice, and an unwanted one at that.

On the other hand, if intelligence strives for omniscience and strives to be believed, giving a third place to influence, serendipity may take over. Unselfconscious intelligence work, even in the speculative and highly competitive area of estimates, may prove (in fact, has provided many times) a key determinant in policy decision.

With one final notice that characterizations by decades are an author’s convenience, the 1980s saw a resurgence of emphasis, in both Agency doctrine and practice, on the obligation of analysts to see that their work in fact was useful to policymakers. For one thing, more and more managers and analysts came to take seriously the criticism of CIA analysis from vocal policymakers and to grasp the limitations of the “to whom it may concern” approach to the relationship that was routinely employed in the previous period.

More important, Robert M. Gates, as Deputy Director for Intelligence from 1982 to 1986, pushed a new doctrinal line that in effect reflected Kent’s 1949 emphasis on seeking guidance as well as major elements of the activism recommended by Kendall. Gate’s views on what kinds of analysis would be appreciated rather than scorned by policymakers were developed during his service on the National Security Council staff during the 1970’s. He observed that CIA analysts knew how every government in the world worked—except their own. At a minimum, he wanted every intelligence assessment to make explicit the implications for US policy of its key judgments. Better yet, he wanted each assessment to highlight some opportunity or threat that the targeted policy audience faced. At one point, he echoed Kent’s 1949 dictum that analysts could not earn their pay if they were not thoroughly familiar with the world of policy makers. In Gates’s words:
Unless intelligence officers are down in the trenches with the policymakers, understand the issues, and know what US objectives are, how the process works, and who the people are, they cannot possibly provide either relevant or timely intelligence that will contribute to better informed decisions.\textsuperscript{36}

Gates, even though supported by DCI William Casey, met resistance at both the practical and doctrinal levels. Changes in practice were slow in coming, largely because many analysts preferred to continue doing what they were trained for and accustomed to doing. But doctrinal considerations were also brought to bear. I teach a course commissioned by Casey and Gates on intelligence successes and failures.\textsuperscript{37} During the mid-1980’s, the students, experienced CIA analysts and frontline supervisors, regularly raised the name of Sherman Kent to ward off Gates’s efforts to close their distance from the policy world.

Resistance notwithstanding, bureaucratically impressive changes have taken place in CIA analytic practice in the past 10 years toward both Kent’s vigorous pursuit of guidance and Kendall’s more activist policy-supported standard. The number of informal "typescript" memorandums written at the request of policy officials or to satisfy their specifically targeted intelligence needs has grown sharply. Oral briefings and especially informal exchanges with individual policy officials have also grown apace. The establishment of CIA centers for counterterrorism and counternarcotics that combine analysts with collectors and operational officers also serves to increase the ties between producer and consumer. At least one senior policy official gives CIA analysts high marks for their enterprise and substantive competence in supporting policymaking during 1989-90. (Though he also notes that he made a considerable effort to establish effective, professional relations.)\textsuperscript{38} Finally, President Bush’s readiness to ask questions of his former Agency provides, at least temporarily, guidance of the highest order.

Purists who will settle for nothing less than seeing Kendall’s view’s on close policy support become the dominant CIA doctrine will still find much to criticize on that score. The change has been from a weak to a substantial, but by no means an all-out, effort to make intelligence assessments more “user friendly.” More specially, Kendall’s recommended approach of pointing out the aspects of external situations that the US can influence is not broadly applied. The final issue for this article is the matter of what additional changes in the CIA’s practices regarding relations with policy makers are needed to meet the challenges of the 1990s.

**Producer-Consumer Relations in the 1990s**

Currently, all aspects of US national security organization, priorities, and funding have come under uncommon scrutiny. The new decade already bears witness to the fact that external challenges to US well-being, while not as awesome as during the height of the Cold War, will be more numerous, more diverse, more nettlesome. And budgetary problems that will have an impact on national security resources sooner rather than later beg for more efficient use of intelligence expertise on foreign countries and global problems.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in February 1991, launched a major review of the missions and functions of US intelligence agencies. The newly appointed chairman of the intelligence committee in the House of Representatives has also shown interest in reassessing practices and priorities.\textsuperscript{39} I trust these and any other examinations will give due importance to producer-consumer relations. For those who would address the issue, I would like to table five recommendations for consideration.

First, pay attention to the latter-day evocation of Kendall’s doctrine, as espoused by Roy Godson, the Coordinator of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. Every intelligence manager and analyst should understand why “opportunities-oriented analysis” appeals to those with experience on the staffs of top-level decision makers. Most simply put, assessments that address the factors that the US can influence to reduce threats to and enhance opportunities for our national interests provide besieged policy officers with the actionable insights they need to complete their arduous daily rounds. And I can understand the latters’ irritation when the intelligence product is restricted solely to descriptions of the events and trends with which they must contend.\textsuperscript{40} Intelligence analysts should be trained to deploy their expertise in a variety of more “user friendly” yet professional ways. I have argued elsewhere that the costs of such training will be considerable; some form of jump-start effort is called for that includes experienced as well as new analysts.\textsuperscript{41}
Second, do not forget the Kent of the 1949 book. If intelligence analysts were made mere extensions of the various policymaking staffs, the nation would lose some important advantages it has heavily invested in over the past half-century:

- Cadres with the time and incentive to develop in-depth understanding of issues which suddenly become important, such as ethnic groups in the USSR and in the Persian Gulf, and who are committed to calling attention to “the stubborn fact” that could complicate policy initiatives.

- Members of the national security team whose primary interest is how foreign governments work, even as they mightily seek guidance on helping the US Government to work better.

- An intelligence unit that can provide a level playing field for the many policymaking contenders for influence on the President’s decisions.

And one more thing that Kent did not pay much attention to: an intelligence unit with sufficient independence of the administration’s policymaking teams to command the respect and trust of Congress.

Third, recognize that the doctrines of Kent and Kendall are not mutually exclusive. A growing number of intelligence veterans believe that analysts and their managers can maintain their basic identities as men and women of study while playing cameo roles in direct support of the policymaking process. For example, a time-honored tradition allows intelligence analysts to be seconded to a policymaking unit for a tour of a year or two, during which time they carry out the normal duties of that unit and, incidentally, learn much about its requirements for intelligence support. When the national interest requires and the benefits exceed the risks, why cannot an intelligence professional take a one-week or one-day tour to bring expertise more immediately to the task of drafting or implementing policy? Such initiatives require the understanding and support of both intelligence and policy leaders so that the analyst’s policymaking activities are not paraded as intelligence assessments.

Lastly, because policymakers ultimately determine the relevance of analysts, get the consumers of intelligence to identify their priority needs as clearly as possible. I expect in a period of diminishing resources at least some policymaking units will press upon intelligence units for all kinds of time-consuming support previously provided by in-house staffs. Other units will likely prefer to criticize intelligence’s shortcoming rather than to take steps needed to encourage cooperation.

While the intelligence unit has to take the major share of responsibility for improving relationships; large steps forward also require that policymaking units take seriously any efforts to redraw the lines of engagement. This really has to start with clear and persistent signals at the level of the Office of the President. Indeed, formal training in making the relationship work would suit policymakers as well as intelligence makers.

NOTES

1. *Strategic Intelligence* was published in 1949 and reprinted in 1951 and 1965. Except for minor adjustments for two footnotes added in 1951, the page content of the text is identical in all editions. A second substantive preface was added in 1965. The book also was published in several paperback and foreign language editions.

2. Kendall’s review appeared in the then new journal *World Politics* (Vol. I, No.4, July 1949). The journal was published by the Institute of International Studies, then located at Yale University, where both Kent and Kendall served on the faculty.

In today’s terms, OSS would be an “agency,” and the R&A Branch would be equivalent to an “office.” The constituent units of R&A were “divisions,” probably what they would be called today. Kent’s version of his R&A service is found in Kent Papers, Series II, Tapes 4-7. See also Winks, pp. 62-115.

Kent to Harold Nicholson, 31 December 1946, Kent Papers, Box 5, 112.

Kent’s strong feelings about the experience at State are recorded in Kent Papers, Series II, Tapes 7-8; and in “How Effective Is Our Intelligence?” an article published in *The Reporter*, Vol. 3, No.6, 12 September 1950), pp. 17-19, in which Kent avers that R&A was “not demobilized but demolished” by the old hands at State.

Kent’s brief depiction of his work on the book is found in Kent Papers, Series II, Tape 8, pp. 18-19 and Tape 9, pp. 8-9:

Jackson had served along with Allen Dulles on a group commissioned by the National Security Council to review CIA practices in 1948, at which time he had access to part of Kent’s draft manuscript. (William Darling, *The DCI Historical Series: The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government*, to 1950, written in 1953, declassified 1989, p. 54). Jackson met Kent in 1949, in conjunction with writing a favorable review of his “very remarkable book.” (*The New York Times Book Review* 1 May 1949, pp. 4, 20). Some accounts have Kent seeking to return to intelligence work, but Kent’s own account indicates his return 1950 was at General Smith’s insistence (Kent Papers, Series II, Tapes 10 and 13).

Thomas Powers reports that Kent was one of only three CIA veterans who refused to be interviewed in connection with his *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (1979), p. xi, 312.

Unless otherwise indicated, all citations for this section are from *Strategic Intelligence*, pp. 180-206.


I am indebted to Ambassador Charles Lichtenstein, who met Kendall as a student at Yale and remained a colleague until Kendall’s death in 1967, for information on the 1941-46 period (interviews, 9 and 19 November 1990). See also the entry under Kendall in the 1961 *American Political Science Association Biographical Dictionary*, p. 131.


Nash, pp. 230, 247, 403-404.


Lichtenstein interview, 19 November 1900; interview with Howard Penniman, 5 February 1991. Penniman was a colleague of Kendall’s starting in the late 1930’s. Neither man could recall Kendall mentioning his views on intelligence.

All citations are from *World Politics*, Vol. I, No.4 (July 1949), pp. 542-552.
20. Emphasis in the original.

21. Emphasis in the original.


23. The Kent Papers show no major changes in the three drafts of the chapter on producer-consumer relations. Kent kept a torn-out copy of the World Politics review, on which he mocked Kendall’s reference (p. 547) to his experience as an intelligence “official.”

24. The Darling volume (note 8) contains much useful and interesting information. The first volume of Ludwell Lee Montague’s five-volume history of the Bedell Smith period (The DCI Historical Series: Gen Walter Bedell Smith As Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950-February 1953: Volume I, The Essential Background, written in 1971, approved for release, 1990) is easier to read for broad trends and probably more reliable.

25. William Langer’s review of Kent’s book, Knowledge for Security, Yale Review, Winter 1950, p. 366, refers to “the relationship of gence work to policy-making” and other aspects of the intelligence task as “still a burning issue in Washington that deserves deep and prolonged thought.” The Eberstadt and Dulles reports recommended that analyst-generated reports be replaced with reports dedicated to the requirements of policy officials (Darling, pp. 101-102).


27. The phrase comes from Edward Proctor, as a characterization of what attracted him and other scholars to CIA in the early 1950s. Proctor later became Deputy Director for Intelligence. Interview, October 1988.


29. Cline’s remarks were delivered at a staff meeting in 1963 attended by the author. Cline remembers trying to make the point, but not the metaphor. Interview, December 1989.

30. Ray S. Cline, “Policy Without Intelligence,” Foreign Policy, Winter 1974-75, pp. 121-135, takes Kissinger to task for ignoring intelligence assessments. Cline had recently resigned from his position as director of State’s intelligence bureau.

31. Recalling practices in ONE in his draft memoirs (Series II, Tape 12, p. I.), Kent seemed proud of the fact that he never bothered to know the positions of key policymakers on the issues under assessment in National Intelligence Estimates.


33. Cooper, 234-236. Interview, 5 March 1991. Cooper had been Kent’s Deputy Director in ONE in 1962, and shifted to working as Cline’s deputy in good measure because of disagreement with Kent on the issue of producer-consumer relations.

34. Foreign Service Journal, April 1969. The article was adapted by Kent from his presentation before an Intelligence Methods Conference in London in September 1966. Kent’s subheading for the two paragraphs was “Truth Before Power.”


37. Letter from Director, Public Affairs, CIA, Foreign Policy, Spring 1985, p. 171.
38. Ambassador Robert Blackwill, then a Senior Director of the National Security Council staff, in remarks at Harvard University, March 1990.


40. Godson, pp. 4-7.

Lesson Plan 2
Action/Reaction

Background Briefing

9/11 was not the first time that the United States has experienced terror on its soil. Throughout American history, the U.S. government has taken a variety of actions to improve national security as a result of acts of terror, including creating legislation and establishing government agencies like the FBI, CIA, and the Department of Homeland Security. By examining a Domestic Security Legislation Chart and researching five historic actions that the U.S. government has taken in response to terrorist incidents, students can form a better understanding of the range of these government actions, how our domestic security systems have evolved, and compare the historic actions/reactions to those taken after the 9/11 attacks.

Objectives

After completing this lesson students will be able to:

- identify a range of key U.S. government actions taken in response to terrorist activity in the past.
- determine whether these actions are still being used to fight terror today.
- identify the legislation that authorizes these actions.
- discuss how the actions taken after the 9/11 terrorist attacks have influenced legislation that are guiding current and future government actions.

Activity

Divide the class into five small groups. Assign each group one of the U.S. government actions that has been taken in the past (listed on the worksheets provided). Each group will do the following:

- Research when the federal action was taken.
- Try to determine whether the action was considered successful in combating terror.
- Determine if the resulting legislation is still in effect today and/or if new legislation has replaced the historic legislation and why.
- Write a team briefing report (worksheets provided).
- Report to the class on their findings.
Group #1 Action / Reaction Worksheet

**Historical Context: First Red Scare**
In 1919, a series of bombings targeted prominent politicians and industrialists including Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. These targets were supporters of anti-immigration legislation and judges who presided at trials of labor unionists.

**Government Actions: The Palmer Raids: Arrests and Deportation**
In November 1919 and January 1920, under the leadership of the United States Department of Justice radical leftists, especially anarchists and communists, were arrested and deported from the United States.

Research the events surrounding this period in American history and find out the following:

Who were all the key players (individuals/groups)?

Describe in detail the specific acts of terror.

Describe the government’s actions more fully:
Group #1 Action / Reaction Worksheet, continued

Were these government actions effective? Why or why not?

Was there resulting legislation? (consult the dates on the Domestic Security Legislation Chart)

Do you think these actions would be effective or legal today? Would they be reasonable actions for the 9/11 case?
Group #2  Action / Reaction Worksheet

**Historical Context: World War II**
During World War II, there was widespread fear that the U.S. mainland would be attacked by German, Italian, and Japanese agents. Suspicion turned to these immigrant communities and some Americans feared that their neighbors, many of whom had lived in the country for decades, were spies or saboteurs.

**Government Actions: Relocation and Detention**
In 1942 Presidential Executive Order 9066 authorized the forcible relocation of American citizens of Japanese descent and resident aliens, and specific German- and Italian-Americans into detention camps in the U.S.

Research the events surrounding this period in American history and find out the following:

Who were all the key players (individuals/groups)?

Describe in detail the specific acts of terror.

Describe the government’s actions more fully:
Were these government actions effective? Why or why not?

Was there resulting legislation? (consult the dates on the Domestic Security Legislation Chart)

Do you think these actions would be effective or legal today? Would they be reasonable actions for the 9/11 case?
Group #3 Action / Reaction Worksheet

**Historical Context: Left-wing political and social violence in the 1970s**

In the early 1970s, the United States faced a new wave of terrorism as long simmering tensions over the Vietnam War, social reform, and civil rights erupted into violence.

**Government Actions: Discredit, Destroy, and Disrupt**

The FBI targeted radical groups/individuals through wire-tapping, leaking false information, infiltrating meetings, and conducting clandestine searches of private homes.

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Research the events surrounding this period in American history and find out the following:

Who were all the key players (individuals/groups)?

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Describe in detail the specific acts of terror.

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Describe the government’s actions more fully:
Were these government actions effective? Why or why not?

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___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
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Was there resulting legislation? (consult the dates on the Domestic Security Legislation Chart)

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Do you think these actions would be effective or legal today? Would they be reasonable actions for the 9/11 case?

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Group #4 Action / Reaction Worksheet

**Historical Context: The 2nd Red Scare**
In the years prior to and throughout the Cold War, Americans were concerned that Communists were a threat to American security.

**Government Actions: Congressional hearings and arrests**
Throughout this period the government conducted a wide range of activities to discover and thwart the spread of Communism, ranging from Congressional hearings, spying against American citizens, and arresting suspected Communists.

Research the events surrounding this period in American history and find out the following:

Who were all the key players (individuals/groups)?

Describe in detail the specific acts of terror.

Describe the government’s actions more fully:
Group #4 Action / Reaction Worksheet, continued

Were these government actions effective? Why or why not?

Was there resulting legislation? (consult the dates on the Domestic Security Legislation Chart)

Do you think these actions would be effective or legal today? Would they be reasonable actions for the 9/11 case?
Group #5 Action / Reaction Worksheet

Historical Context: Right-wing extremist violence from the mid-1980s to the present
Anti-government and conspiracy-oriented groups to racial and religious supremacists, right-wing extremism has been on the rise in the U.S. since the mid-1980s.

Government Actions: Increased inter-agency coordination to monitor domestic groups and new criminal penalties for activities relating to terrorism.
The increasing violence of a range of far-right extremist groups, such as the standoff between the ATF and Randy Weaver at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, in 1992 and the government’s siege and storming of the Branch Davidian religious sect’s compound in Waco Texas in 1993, culminating with the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, which killed 168 people, served as a wake-up call to the rise of homegrown terrorism. Limits on FBI authority to investigate potentially dangerous domestic groups were eased.

Research the events surrounding this period in American history and find out the following:

Who were all the key players (individuals/groups)?

Describe in detail the specific acts of terror.

Describe the government’s actions more fully:
Group #5 Action / Reaction Worksheet, continued

Were these government actions effective? Why or why not?

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Was there resulting legislation? (consult the dates on the Domestic Security Legislation Chart)

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Do you think these actions would be effective or legal today? Would they be reasonable actions for the 9/11 case?

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## DOMESTIC SECURITY LEGISLATION CHART

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official Name</th>
<th>Popular Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Enactment</th>
<th>Statute</th>
<th>Update</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Espionage Act</td>
<td>Barbour Espionage Act</td>
<td>Imposed heavy punishment on any activities that weakened or imperiled the country's national defense in both wartime and peace. Punishable offenses included obtaining information on military operations and passing documents, blueprints and photographs to others with the intent of injuring the U.S. To assist in military recruitment in World War I, the act also outlawed public objection to the war.</td>
<td>June 17, 1917</td>
<td>Chapter 30, 40 Stat. 217</td>
<td>Amended. Various sections revised and codified in 18 USC §§11, 791–794, 2388, 3241; 22 USC §§220–222, 401–408; 50 USC §§191, 192, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabotage Act</td>
<td></td>
<td>Made it a crime to damage or destroy property or utilities used in connection with the war.</td>
<td>April 20, 1918</td>
<td>Chapter 59, 40 Stat. 533</td>
<td>Enactment repealed by Act of June 25, 1948. Some sections revised and codified in 18 USC §§2151–2156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedition Act</td>
<td></td>
<td>Declared it unlawful for any person to publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language intended to cause contempt for the government, Constitution, or flag of the United States.</td>
<td>May 16, 1918</td>
<td>Chapter 75, 40 Stat. 553</td>
<td>Act Repealed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deportation Act</td>
<td></td>
<td>Provided that aliens convicted under the Espionage Act, Sabotage Act, or other criminal acts of the United States could be taken into the custody on a warrant and deported 'if the Secretary of Labor, after hearing, finds that such aliens are undesirable residents of the United States.'</td>
<td>May 10, 1920</td>
<td>Chapter 174, 41 Stat. 593</td>
<td>Act Repealed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Agents Registration Act</td>
<td>Propaganda Agency Act</td>
<td>Requires every agent of a foreign government to register with the Department of Justice and file forms outlining its agreements with, income from, and expenditures on behalf of the foreign government.</td>
<td>June 8, 1938</td>
<td>Chapter 327, 52 Stat. 631</td>
<td>Codified at 22 USC §§611–621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alien Registration Act</td>
<td>Smith Act</td>
<td>Required the registration and fingerprinting of all aliens over age 14. Makes punishable the advocacy of the overthrow of any government - federal, state or local - by force and violence and organization of or membership--past or present-- in any group which so advocates.</td>
<td>June 28, 1940</td>
<td>Chapter 439, 54 Stat. 670</td>
<td>Enactment repealed by Act of June 25, 1948. Revised and codified in 18 USC §§2385.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## DOMESTIC SECURITY LEGISLATION CHART, continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official Name</th>
<th>Popular Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Enactment</th>
<th>Statute</th>
<th>Update</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Subversive Activities Act</td>
<td>Voorhis Anti-Propaganda Act</td>
<td>Barred political groups in the US from either receiving or contributing funds to subversive organizations with an international character.</td>
<td>October 17, 1940</td>
<td>Chapter 897, 54 Stat. 1201</td>
<td>Enactment repealed by Act of June 25, 1948. Revised and codified in 18 USC §2386.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Security Act</td>
<td>McCarran Act</td>
<td>Specified that present or former membership in the Communist party or any other &quot;totalitarian&quot; party or its affiliates was a ground for inadmissibility.</td>
<td>September 23, 1950</td>
<td>Chapter 1024, 64 Stat. 1012</td>
<td>Revised by Act of March 26, 1964; codified at 50 USC §§831-832, 834-835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Control Act</td>
<td></td>
<td>Outlawed the Communist Party of the United States and its affiliates, and prohibited members of Communist organizations from serving in certain representative (government) capacities.</td>
<td>August 24, 1954</td>
<td>Chapter 886, 68 Stat. 775</td>
<td>Codified at 50 USC §§841-844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act [AEDPA]</td>
<td></td>
<td>Restricts the possession and use of materials capable of producing catastrophic damage, increases restrictions on alien terrorists and allows for swift deportation of criminal aliens, regulates and monitors the financial support mechanisms of international terrorists, expands the circumstances under which foreign governments may be sued for the terrorist acts of their citizens, and substantially amends U.S. habeas corpus law in order to ensure swifter justice for death row inmates.</td>
<td>April 24, 1996</td>
<td>110 Stat. 1214</td>
<td>Codified at 8 USC §1189, 8 USC §1531, 8 USC §1532, 8 USC §1533, 8 USC §1534, 8 USC §1535, 8 USC §1536, 8 USC §1537, 8 USC §1252c, 18 USC §2332c, 18 USC §2332b, 18 USC §2332d, 18 USC §2339b, 18 USC §3059b, 18 USC §3295, 18 USC §3613a, 18 USC §3663a, 22 USC §2377, 22 USC §262p-4q, 22 USC §2349aa-10, 22 USC §2781, 28 USC §2261, 28 USC §2262, 28 USC §2263, 28 USC §2264, 28 USC §2265, 28 USC §2266, 42 USC §10603b, 42 USC §10608.</td>
</tr>
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9/11: The Intelligence Angle

Activity Idea

Intelligence Analysis: Collecting the Dots/Connecting the Dots

Background Briefing

It is often said that the role of intelligence is “to speak truth to power.” The function of intelligence is to describe the world as it is and might be, not as we wish it to be. The 9/11 Commission Report revealed that various intelligence collection agencies had information pertaining to the 9/11 plot but information sharing between agencies was flawed; therefore, some information/intelligence was never connected sufficiently. Effectively, some of the “dots” were collected but not connected. One example of this is that the FBI had received reports of Hazmi and Mihdhar (two of the attackers) enrolling in flight school in California and wanting to learn how to fly but having little interest in learning how to land the aircraft. This one little piece of the intelligence, when fit in with other pieces, forms a pretty clear scenario (at least in hindsight) of the idea that airplanes might be used as missiles. But these pieces of the puzzle were scattered, not shared, or simply not well analyzed. It is said that 9/11 was not so much an intelligence failure as it was a failure of imagination: no one imagined that this middle-eastern terrorist group would hijack planes as weapons against buildings in major metropolitan areas.

9/11 was not the first time in history when intelligence was not properly collected or connected (analyzed). Compare and contrast the case studies of Pearl Harbor, The Cuban Missile Crisis, and 9/11 to determine the characteristics of an intelligence failure and an intelligence success.
20/20 Hindsight

During the height of the attacks on the morning of September 11, 2001, there was mass public confusion on many levels. For example, it was difficult to determine who was responsible for the attacks, who organized the attacks, and what was their motive(s). By the end of the day on 9/11, however, all the names of the attackers were known and it was known that the middle-eastern terrorist group, Al Qaeda, was responsible. By 9/12 this information was published in national newspapers. Since 9/11, the Gallup Organization has polled the American public and produced various studies that indicate that despite the fact that it has been definitively established that Al Qaeda was responsible for the 9/11 attacks, today there is still a question in some people’s minds about who was responsible.

Students can:

- Interview members of the public and ask them who they think is responsible for the 9/11 attacks.
- Compile and analyze their collected data.
- Design and implement an education campaign in which they provide accurate information about the perpetrators if they notice a trend toward misunderstanding or doubt on the part of the public.
- Discuss why there are different theories about who was responsible for the attacks.
- Find articles and opinion on the internet and discuss them.
PRINCETON, NJ - Here is a rundown on the highlights of American public opinion as measured in the days following the September 11 attacks, with a particular focus on Gallup's latest survey completed September 14-15, 2001.

- Presidential job approval has risen faster than any comparable "rally" event in Gallup polling history, from 51% in the weekend just prior to September 11, to 86% September 14-15.

- Bush's current 86% job approval is just three points below the highest measured in Gallup history.

- Over nine out of ten Americans approve of the way Bush is handling the aftermath of the terrorist attacks.

- Gallup's measure of overall satisfaction with the way things are going in the United States has gone up, not down, over the past week, rising from 43% just prior to the attacks, to 61% now.

- Two measures of the economy - one rating the current economy and the other asking about the economy going forward - registered slight increases from the weekend before the attacks to this past weekend.

- Most stock market investors say the terrorist attacks will make no difference in their probability of investing in the market, with little sign of investor panic.

- Americans remain very strongly supportive of U.S. military action in reprisal for the attacks.

- Support for military action remains strong even when Americans are reminded that it might take years, might involve ground troops, might involve American casualties, might involve a reinstatement of the draft, and might have a negative effect on the economy.

- Americans are willing to wait until those who were responsible for the attacks are identified rather than launching attacks immediately.

- Over 8 out of 10 Americans say that Osama bin Laden bears a great deal of responsibility for the attacks. Sixty-four percent say the same about Afghanistan.

- The significant majority of Americans consider that the U.S. is currently at war.

- Most Americans are willing to put up with such things as having to go through metal detectors in public places and checking in up to three hours before flights in order to increase security.

- At the same time, Americans are not willing to sanction such things as allowing police to stop people at random on the street for searches, or making it easier for law enforcement to read mail and e-mails.

- A majority of Americans favor having Arabs, even those who are U.S. citizens, being subjected to separate, more intensive security procedures at airports. About half of Americans favor requiring Arabs, even those who are citizens of the U.S., to carry special ID.

- Two thirds of Americans would like to see the World Trade Center towers rebuilt.

- The events of September 11 have affected Americans emotionally. Seven out of ten Americans, including almost six out of ten men, say that they have cried. Many have attended memorial services and expressed love for family in ways they may not usually do, and prayed.

- Very few Americans disagree with the decision to postpone most major sporting events over this past weekend.

- Americans have followed news of the terrorist attacks more closely than any other news story Gallup has measured in its history using the "closely followed" question.

- About half of Americans remain at least somewhat worried that they or a family member will become a victim of a terrorist attack, down slightly from Tuesday night.
Nine Years After 9/11, Few See Terrorism as Top U.S. Problem

One percent see it as the top problem today, down from 46% in 2001

GALLUP NEWS SERVICE
by Frank Newport

PRINCETON, NJ -- Nine years after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, 1% of Americans mention terrorism as the most important problem facing the country, down from 46% just after the attacks.

Terrorism as Most Important U.S. Problem

September 2001-August 2010

Just before the attacks, in a Gallup poll conducted Sept. 7-10, 2001, less than one-half of 1% of Americans mentioned terrorism as the nation’s most important problem. One month later, in October 2001, 46% named terrorism, the highest in Gallup’s history.

From that point on, terrorism slowly faded as a response to this question. At the one-year anniversary of the attacks, in September 2002, 19% of Americans mentioned terrorism as the country’s top problem, already eclipsed by the economy at the top of the list. By the five-year anniversary of the attacks in September 2006, 11% of Americans mentioned terrorism. Terrorism continued to drop from that point, albeit with an uptick to 8% mentions in January of this year, reflecting the widespread news coverage of the “Christmas Day bomber” who allegedly attempted to detonate explosives on a Northwest Airlines plane headed for Detroit.

As terrorism has faded, other concerns have risen in importance. Over the past nine years, Americans have most commonly mentioned the war in Iraq (from 2003 to early 2008) and the economy or jobs (from 2008 to the present) as the top problem facing the country.

Despite the drop in top-of-mind mentions of terrorism, Americans still say it is an important issue when they are reminded of it. Gallup recently asked Americans to rate the importance of a number of issues to their vote in this year’s midterm elections, and 75% rated terrorism as an extremely or very important issue when they are reminded of it.
immigration, Afghanistan, and the environment. The Sept. 11 attacks took place during the Republican Bush administration, which soon thereafter launched a “war on terrorism.” Republicans have consistently been given more credit than Democrats for handling terrorism over the years since; in an August USA Today/Gallup poll, 55% of Americans say the Republicans in Congress are better able to handle the issue of terrorism, while 31% choose the Democrats.

**Bottom Line**
The low top-of-mind salience of terrorism as the top problem facing the nation no doubt reflects the absence of major terrorist attacks on U.S. soil in the nine years since 2001, although there have been occasional news reports of thwarted attacks. It may also reflect the degree to which economic concerns are crowding out most other issues at this point in the nation’s history. The dramatic jump in perceptions of terrorism as the most important problem between September and October 2001, however, serves as a reminder of the potential for terrorism to reclaim its prominence as a concern should there be new terrorist incidents in the future.