

EPISODE 478

[00:00:00] AH: I just wanted to start off with your new book. Could you tell us why you wrote *Spymaster's Prism* and what it's all about?

[00:00:09] JD: Andrew, it's great to be on the show, getting right to the point, I wrote a book, *Good Hunting*, couple years ago. And I started writing another one about the Cold War predecessors of mine. And there were interesting characters. And I started to write. It was going to be a nice little book. And then the elections came in 2016. And it just flashed back to me, the Cold War and the Russians, and this new environment we're in, which is operating inside the United States in the action part. And I thought that warranted more attention. I think we spent a lot of time in the election period talking about personalities, and people and so on, and we weren't looking what I think is a core problem. And that is, unlike the Cold War, Putin and his administration are actually operating trying to create dissidents and weaken the base, political base in the United States. I think that's a big story that isn't adequately understood. So I thought I'd write the history and go back and forth between today and the past, and intelligence operations, and the people involved in it, and how it all comes together of the moment, so to speak. That's the real reason for it.

[00:01:22] AH: I have a very well-thumbed copy of *Good Hunting*. One of the questions that I had was you pick Russia as the theme of your book. Now, Russia has been in the news a lot recently about some people would say that China's a beggar long-term threat to the United States. So I just wondered if you could tell us a little bit more about why Russia and not China?

[00:01:46] JD: I think in the case of the China story, I think you use the word long-term. And I think that's the case. They are the preeminent political, economic, military force that we're going to have to contend with over the horizon. The difference is the Russians are involved in intelligence, and not just intelligence operations in the United States. The Chinese are as well, but the Chinese aren't using it to cause political problems in United States, not because their Boy Scouts, but because it would impact on the bigger economic relationship, and it isn't part of their strategy. And everyone's focused on China. And I think that's a good thing. But in the process, they're missing what I consider an urgent issue, and the Russians in the United States, and also a better appreciation that we don't have ground rules in the cyber war, like we had on

many other things during the Cold War. And the Russians are much more aggressive in the warfare part of it in terms of doing things than the Chinese. The Chinese have a very robust collection capability. And again, I think we can be distracted.

Andrew, if you'd entertain a comment on just the Russian strategy for a second.

[00:03:06] JD: Absolutely.

[00:03:06] AH: They actually have a strategy. Putin has a strategy. It's a Cold War strategy. I think he's executing his strategy very well. He's punching above Russia's weight. Its DDP is smaller than Germany and Spain's, but he's punching above his weight. And he's carrying out his strategy effectively. It's just a bad strategy, not only for the world, but for Russia as well. But he comes at it with a Cold War mentality that somehow the United States is implacably an adversary, that he has to weaken the countries around them. He has to regain control of the Ukraine, because Russia without the Ukraine is a much smaller player economically, politically and militarily. So he's – Warm water ports. I mean, these are all themes of the Cold War and trying to cause problems in Venezuela or least play in those grounds. It's a bad strategy.

But the commander in chief of your Armed Forces, I believe this is 2014, Gerasimov, came up with this hybrid strategy, which means you use propaganda, disinformation, political action to weaken your enemy. So they're not trying to create a revolution in the United States. They're trying to weaken our political process. And it was like, look back to 2016, and you got away from the stirring up of that immediate period and going after the Russians. I think what we didn't appreciate is just how effective that operation was, while it indeed impacted on the election around the edges. But more importantly, we've been snapping at each other's ankles for the past four years, rooted much around what the Russians did, right? So I don't think they knew how big their operation would play out in our political process. And it wasn't on Election Day. It was the aftermath, but as part of a strategy. In other words, this isn't a one-off. Let's dabble and have a little fun in American elections. This has a strategy, and not to destabilize the United States, because they don't want to have to deal with the uncertainty of that. But they want to keep it politically disruptive. In fact they use the word chaos over and over again. And chaos is too strong of a word. But I think this is the point that we need to pay attention to. And I don't think we have an understanding with the Russians.

The one thing that the audience may not understand is that is what we did in the Cold War. Despite all the James Bond movies, you see it was not after Stalin. He was involved in causing political problems inside Russia. And with few exceptions, neither were the Russians inside the United States. It was one of the ground rules we had under the Moscow rules.

[00:05:47] AH: Tell us a little bit more about the strategy. Where does it come from? What are the drivers? Why is Russia doing what it's doing?

[00:05:56] JD: I think the key – I have a chapter in the book called Spymaster President, right? Not hard to figure out who that is. But I have a quote underneath it, “There is no such thing as a former KGB officer. Vladimir Putin.” So in his own words, he's worked from a KGB mentality. I could write one saying there's no such thing as a former CIA officer. Jack Devine. But I know it doesn't mean we're on the payroll of the CIA. But it means we have a way of looking at things. And people have to understand that he wanted to be in the KGB at 17. He eventually got in. Was quite successful, but was still fairly junior. And he wasn't assigned to Paris or London, Hong Kong, or Tokyo, or Mexico City. It was in Dresden. And to be one to find that this will place the B in the Cold War, go to Dresden, and it's East Germany. And like, “Hurrah!” Writes his books based on the East German world. Karla was actually Marcus Wolf, who is probably the most famous spymaster of the Cold War. He had under 10,000 spies. But that's the environment in which Putin made his own so to speak.

And the Soviet Union collapsed while he was there. And you remember, he's destroying the papers. And he's a Russian nationalist, which is. And understand, I'm an American nationalist, right? So I understand that, but it was a tremendous blow. He says this over and over again in his writings and comments. So his destiny was to try and recreate a Russia that he understood. It's a Cold War Russia, and we're in a Cold War too, and no one seems to recognize it, right? But because it's in the cyber world, so it's not as visible. But I would say the Ukraine and his adventures and aggressive behavior there is very visible, and very much in a Cold War style. You send in covert action asset, green men, if you will. And he took over the Crimea.

So the strategy and the thinking is rooted deeply in the Cold War. And I think it was effective strategy for the Cold War for them and us. But, frankly, where I sit today, I think that a reset is

better. And we don't have – Russia to be part of Europe, but not logically oppose those. They don't have any analogy. They have nothing to sell. I mean, who wants the Russian model? I mean, there isn't any.

So the stumbling block is this mindset that somehow we're in this – He's in a struggle with us. And the problem with the reset – I served in Argentina, if you might remember, from your earlier readings, and not only have great beef, but I always found the tango to be a fascinating national dance. But there's that old movie saying, takes two to tango. And I think if Putin, and yes, reset. But if the other person doesn't feel like dancing the tango, it was a terribly ugly dance if you do it yourself. So I think that's where we are. I don't think we've addressed how are we going to deal with this challenge. I mean, if he's got to stay this course, by all means, try a charm offensive. It just won't work, because he's already told you this, and I'm a spymaster. You pour on the charm. But I've got my agenda here right beside me, and I'm sticking to it.

When you walk into KGB order, and the CIA headquarters, where you put your badge, and I think they infect it with some new DNA. You're either blessed with it or stuck with it however you look at it. I consider myself blessed with whatever they did to make me a true believer. He has that in his body politics.

[00:09:40] AH: So you spent a large part of your career engaging with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. But for listeners that didn't have that experience or a little bit rusty, could you just tell us what the contours of that strategy are? What does that strategy look like?

[00:09:57] JD: It was the idea of containing the regressive behavior, finding our allies around the world that would support us, and try and block them. Well, one thing I would point out, I'm not a big fan of putting armed armies on the ground. This is why I'm an advocate and strong supporter of covert action. If you apply what I consider the right principles, people can disagree about them. But one of the things we did in the Cold War was we didn't put armies on the ground. We work with surrogates. We had allies and people on the ground. And that's the story of Afghanistan and the struggle, and that is we work with the indigenous Mujahideen to drive them out. And I still believe that's the best formula for problems. But the 21st century, we've leapt ahead where we tend to put armies in before I would put them in, let me put it that way. And one of the principles of covert action is you've tried everything short of war. And that's

where I think there's an apprehension about using covert action. But I see it as a vehicle for preventing heavier cost of life and treasure for the US. And if you look at the Afghan program to drive the Russians out, it was a very modest program. I don't think – I know the number, but I'm not going to say it, because I'm not sure it's the class, but under 200 people were involved in the second Afghan struggle after 911. And we talked about thousands of troops and very large, whether you want to say \$2 trillion, or one and a half trillion for Afghanistan, I think between Iraq and Afghanistan. Now you've got five to \$6 trillion spent on the use for –

So I want to come back to the Cold War strategy was one of using covert action to try and counter them. And they were trying to do the same thing using their surrogates and trying to combat us wherever they could. We can talk later about why I think we prevailed.

[00:11:59] AH: I just wanted to touch on the idea of Moscow rules. I know when we spoke on the phone you brought up and you bring it up in your writing. Could you just tell our listeners a little bit more about those Moscow rules and what they are?

[00:12:12] JD: I think if you go online and look, what will most often pop up is Moscow rules and it'd tell you how to be a spy in Moscow. Don't wear a national's baseball hat, right? Don't speak in loud English, right? I mean, I'm being a tad, not sarcastic. But these are real things. I mean people operating there, you have to understand that you're under constant surveillance and how you stay alert. So that's one level. And I think that's really good for practitioners spying. If any of your audience wants to be a spy. And I think a lot of them aspire to it. But I mean, this is a handbook that tell you how to be – How to operate, if you're going to operate in Moscow, but you better practice. the Russians are pretty good.

But there's a set of rules that you can't find in writing. There is no book that can catalog for you the Moscow rules. So just so when I entered into the agency, and I remember a number of the senior people I dealt with one way or the other kept referring to the Moscow rules as an understanding. And the understanding was there were some things that we knew we couldn't do against each other and shouldn't do. One was, say, counterfeiting money. And the reason you don't counterfeit money, and they didn't counterfeit it, and we both had the capacity to do it, you would actually destroy the world financial system. So you didn't do it. We didn't rough up their

offices, and they didn't rough up ours. That was an understanding. It was few exceptions. I'll point that out. But by and large, there was our understandings.

But the one – And again, this comes back to a fundamental rule. And that is not meddling in the internal political affairs of each other's country. We could gettled against each other around the world, and history can document all those instances. But that was one of the rules. And I think whenever there was a major problem, and I can think of one in the Afghanistan program, and that problem was we're an army, 125,000 fighters. And then we put the stinger missile in. And the Russians never made it to march. They never said, "Hey, you're misbehaving," because they know this is what we're doing the struggle. But there was a group of enterprising Mujahideen, had nothing to do with us. Roll the truck in one of the stands, and had it full of the Quran books. And the Russians got very upset and made it the marshal on it. And I thought, "Wow. This is really a big deal."

But when I start to look at it years later, I realized that what their concern was all the stands have strong Muslim populations, and they thought we were now meddling in their territory and causing trouble. So when I come back to the Moscow rules, is in that sentence. Of course, we said, "Look. That's not us. Not the game being played here." So I think we need similar understanding in the cyber arena. And I don't think we – The best of my knowledge. And I go by what I see more than anything else. I don't see – Well, they clearly are not adhering to the old rules. And if we've had an understanding and agreed that we're not going to do it, I haven't seen the response on our side that's commensurate with their activity.

[00:15:34] AH: Imagine you get the ear of the person on the Russia desk or the chief of mission or the head of espionage for the American government and Russia. What advice would you give them as someone that has a lot of experience dealing with this kind of thing?

[00:15:53] JD: Well, I would say buy as many copies of Spymater's Prism as you can. No. I mean, what I really would say is why don't you ponder my point? My point is, I really think there is a receptive world out here for you in Russia, and you can be part of it. I don't see any inherent reason why we can't have a strong alliance with Russia. And over the long term, Russia is a nation state, well defined again. Why don't you consider a different alternative? I think that would be a message that I would give. I'm sure my colleagues and people in the diplomatic

world have tried to say this in 100 different ways. So it might be like bringing coals to Newcastle on this. But I think that's the big – I don't think there's any inherent reason. In other words, in the case of the communists, there was no logical reason we couldn't come to a compromise on, right? They were out – But this is a nation state. We're a nation state. They love their country. We love our country. Lots of reasons to do business. Why? I mean, it's mind boggling, and that they would fiddle around on our election is stunning, stunning in the context of what I'm saying.

[00:17:10] AH: I think that that's part of the story that's often overlooked. One of the reasons that the United States and Russia were so antagonistic was that there was this ideological competition that with two mutually incompatible systems, but no, that's gone. So we're on a different landscape. I just want to jump back to the beginning of your career. How did you end up in the world of intelligence, Jack?

[00:17:37] JD: Well, first, I would note that, for many years, I really didn't like the James Bond movies. I mean, I just thought this is silly. You're somehow diminishing my real being. But then I thought, "Wait, who wouldn't want to be viewed as a dashing James Bond omnipotent, never had to write a report, never had to do homework with the kids?" all these things that are really part of real espionage in life. So I come from a blue collar family in Philadelphia, and I think I'm the first one that went to university. None of us traveled around the world. I didn't have five languages. There wasn't an embassy attache in our family. So I really didn't fit the model. It remains a little bit baffling to me how I got in and maybe they had second thoughts along the way.

So what happened is, when I finished graduate school in Philadelphia, I started teaching. And I'm a frustrated teacher, even to this day, and that both of my books are designed with an education orientation that tell you more about the intelligence business. The future practitioners, Karen practitioners, but people just have an interest in what makes it really work in tech. So I was teaching very happy. I was probably going to go on and try and teach university level. And my wife gave me for either birthday or anniversary of book by David Wise called *The Invisible Government* written in the 60s. And it's all about how the CIA controls the world and running all these terrible operations.

Now, the thing that is interesting about it, like many people had a different reaction is, "Wow! That's a really cool place." I mean, it's really interesting. They're saving their country to fighting these communists. So I took a pen. I mean, people actually used to write with pens. I wrote a letter, one pager saying, "Hey, cool outfit. Can I join? And put a stamp on the mail that's CIA, Washington. That's exactly the way it went." Today, you have to go on a computer. You got there to 75. I said this letter. A couple months later, I get the note in the mail saying, "Well, go the 12th and chested and knock on the door three times, and you'll be interviewed." And I did I was interviewed by a guy who I thought was a spy, because he looked like it. Had a slick black hair like Nick Helms who was the director. He had tweed suit, brown pinto and a pipe. I mean, who smokes a pipe nowadays. No. I'm not offending anybody out. So he looked like the Allen Dulles, the way you're supposed to look. Turns out years later, I realized he was an HR person, which is a very important job. But it's not the same as being a spymaster.

Out of a coincidence, years later when I was helping on a history, I think, for the agency, they dug out my original letter. And I think I've improved writing. That's all I've got to say on that. But then I saw the letter by the guy that assessed me. I always thought I must impress them. That's the only way I could have gotten in. The letter was okay. He said, "Look. He looks like a pretty good guy. Maybe he'll fit. Maybe he won't. Let's move on to the next level." A little bit of a downer. But I did end up in the agency.

Why I went there and how I got in. I remember the first day when I went to the farm. Not the first day, because I spent time getting ready and training and at a job before I went to the farm. But I went to farm, I pulled in. I had a Volkswagen, about six years old. One door was black. It was gray dipoles. A guy pulls in beside me with a Porsche. And I had been to Yale. I thought, "Well, this is interesting." So anyway, the career was – For me when I wrote the books, when I write the books, and I think back. I actually believe that my DNA fit the agency. They may disagree with hindsight. But I actually believe that I belong there. And something about my mindset, my approach to things and my sense of mission, they coincided. That's how I got into the agency. I walked in. I wasn't even sure. I didn't know what I was getting into.

But subconsciously, somehow, that emotional IQ as it relates to yourself, I must have seen a pathway. And the second thing I would say, when I looked back over my career, half of it was in

traditional espionage and operations that are familiar with. You can't write about them because they involve sources and it never becomes public. But I spent more than a usual amount of time on the action part. They all become public. So it enables me to write without problems with the agency. But I ended up in Latin America. And I'll just add this last note, to get the trajectory. I mean, I don't know a thing about Latin American and speak Spanish. Why am I in Latin America?

Well, I put in for Russia, because I thought – Communists are there. That's Russia. I should go there. But if you're in Russia, you're not meeting people. You're not meeting agents. You're picking up messages and spending weeks preparing to do that. And it's a very professional task. But I was meant for the action part. So I'm ready to get around to the interview. I'm talking to the guy and he's "Oh, no, you're too tall to be in Russia." And I thought, "Well, I'm six foot five. Okay, maybe I'm too tall." But it's an idiotic statement. Because I sit back and say, "Wait a minute. What's the matter how big you are? You're supposed to do this definitely. You're invisible. It doesn't matter what you look like." But he took me by the arm over the Latin America and he said, "You belong here."

Now I was too young and not yet brash enough to say, "Wait a minute, you told I'm too tall for Russia, but I'm okay for Latin America, right?" So I ended up there. And then by circumstances, they put me on a factory. I was on a small desk, a Dominican Republic desk, but I quickly was put on as the assistant to the chief of covert action for Latin America. And then, lo and behold, the Chile crisis blows up. And next thing you know, I'm in the Chile Task Force. And by then I learned enough Spanish to go work in the field.

Some people have fluency, but mine was where I couldn't tell jokes in Spanish, nor that I understand them. But I got a little better. So your career trajectory was it looked haphazard. Only when I look back, and I see the rest of my career, whether I was running through it, or they were pulling me through certain types of jobs. I only asked for one job, and it was because I was trying to get out of another one. The rest of them, I let the agency drive me where they could. But there was some sort of Moscow rules sort of – An understanding somehow that we're going to use this guy over here, and a series of different managers. And you look back over your career. And I was mentored. And I'm sure I thanked everybody that helped me. But I didn't say

enough. I didn't say, "Gosh! You really –" It would have been a terrible failure if you didn't hold me up here a little bit.

Writing the book, it allowed me to go back – And because I did interviews with so many people, many of them are now gone. That I could personally call them and say, you made to be a big difference. So what I'm saying about the career part – Right. Study Chinese, because it's a hot issue or whatever, but you're going to be agent. You might find that they're going to steer you in a direction that's different, and it may be good for you. But don't go into the – I wouldn't recommend my approach, which is just walk in the door. I do think, to the degree that you can go do the things you would like, and I did that by accident. But if you can do it with forethought, have at it.

[00:25:19] AH: When I look at the history of your career, it's almost a little bit like Forrest Gump in the sense that you –

[00:25:28] JD: Well, thank you for that. That was a stunning compliment. Well, there're a lot of people by the way that agree with you.

[00:25:38] AH: I mean, in the sense that you keep finding yourself and historical, important historical moments. So you're in Chile when the democratically elected President Salvador Allende is overthrown. You find yourself and the Afghan Task Force when stingers are introduced to the battlefield. You find yourself chief of the Iran branch right in the middle of the rank contrast. So you always find yourself in the center of those events. So I wonder, to start off, tell us a little bit more about Allende. Or is there anything you can tell our listeners in the public record or is not common?

[00:26:16] JD: Fortunately, there's a great deal in the public record. And it was investigated very thoroughly by the House Committee and the Senate Committees. And the Senate Committee wrote a comprehensive review. And when I was – And this was '75. A couple years after the coup. I looked at it and I thought, "Oh, this is outrageous that they're writing all of this." And here's my cable. Whoever thought as a young man, my cable would appear in a public document, saying, "Thank God, I spelled Santiago, right." But with hindsight, when I read back when I was doing the research, it actually was a very thorough job. They actually described,

when you got away with the fanfare, the guns and all that. When you looked at it, it's really very accurate history. And you can distort it if you like. I mean, not you, but anyone can try and distort it. But the records there, what the record will show, this is where I started, which was there was an overarching view by the president of the United States and shared by many in the congress, not just Republicans. The consensus broke when the coup came, but before the coup, there was a lot of consensus that this is a bad thing for Latin America, that you have a government and you said was democratic elected. That's true. With a plurality of 38% – 36. I think it was 38. 62% are already against or voted against it. And of your 32%, high percentage of the Communist Party. So there was reason to be concerned about it, right?

And in the context of the Cold War, the question is, “What do you do about it? Do you use strategic patience, where you sit around and hope it goes away? Or do you do something?” And I would have recommended, and I was comfortable with being involved in political action supporting the democratic elements in the newspapers, and what I would call interest groups, commercial businessmen and so on groups.

The coup is a different issue. And this gets at the hard core of covert action. And one of the first principles, it's not that I draw on contemporary philosophers. I dwell on the theologians of the 13th century that have a view of a just war. And I applied the covert action. But one of the first things is you have an intrinsically evil enemy. That's a security threat. But the second one is you've tried everything else short of war. So I think it was premature in those principles for the White House to have instructed the Santiago's CIA station to try and block through a coup Allende taking power after the election.

The TV station there can't mention his name. It's still sealed. A very experienced World War II veteran OSS, very talented, great writer. Wrote back saying this is a bad idea, bloodshed. And by the way, the conditions aren't right, isn't going to work. Really rethink it. And they wrote him a message saying, “If you can't do it, we'll find somebody else.”

So the CIA went on record early on saying it was a bad idea. And people get confused today because they confuse that wrong footed covert action operation to try and block Allende, which failed. And there was a terrible incident, which was not tied to the CIA's activities. Was independent, but it had a negative impact, very serious negative impact. And that a group

supported by [inaudible 00:30:08] and a General Robert, retired General Robert Viaux. And they tried to kidnap the commander in chief of the armed forces. And I would ask, "Why are you going to do that?" I mean, I didn't ask, because I didn't know about it. No one knew about it. They did it and they killed him in the process. At that point, the entire country got behind Allende and said, "Enough is enough. Let's not have this."

So the country is united that lead to Allende. And immediately after that, there was a cable from Henry Kissinger, saying, "All coup plotting will cease and desist. No more coup plotting. Collect intelligence, work the political. Try and defend what we got there. Hold the line. But no more coup plotting." People do not focus on this when they read history or see movies. And I will tell you a certitude that the CIA office there was not engaged in plotting with the military in the 1973 Coup. And I go into the my book, Spymaster's Prism, when I talked about how did we find out about the coup? If you're plotting with the coup plots, you don't need to find out about the coup. You're a part of it, right? And we actually – Our assessment was that Allende was going to last until the end of his term. But he'll lose that election. And we're going to help that happen, right?

But what really happened is there was a group of tank commanders, 80 soldiers and 18 tanks pulled up in front of the palace. And the commander in chief of the Armed Forces came out. This was in June of '73. And said, "Go back to your tanks, boys. We're in charge." We in the office, and then CIA in general felt that was a good testimony of Allende's durability in June. What we didn't know was that day, the military began plotting his overthrow, not because of the shortage of food, not because of the demonstrations, not because of the economy. Their institution, the military institution was starting to crumble and discipline was breaking down. All the other conditions prevailed for sure, and that's what caused that. So we didn't know that. But the tempo was clearly getting more and more tense as we got into the end of the summer. But we still did not believe a coup was eminent, nor does any of the official finished intelligence CIA suggest that.

But right before the coup, I think it was around a couple days before, I received the first report, the US government received, about a coup taking place, that will take place on September 11th. I actually didn't get the report. My wife – I couldn't be reached, I was meeting someone at a nice Italian restaurant. And the fellow that had the report was heading to the airport. He was no stop for go other than he was going to stop and pass this message to me. But he got a hold of my

wife and said there will be a coup on September 11th that involves the army. It'll start at Valparaiso. It'll start at 7, Army, Navy, Air Force and a Carbonari, and it will be advertised on radio adverts towards seven o'clock. That is the first report and. It went by critic. And the analyst in Washington didn't believe it, that that was going to happen.

The reason I mentioned this is it's so fixed in people's mind that somehow we're plotting the truth of matter. We found out about it. And then we did have other reporting coming in shortly thereafter. So there's this mixing of the plots and the mixing up the different types of covert action, one that I'm comfortable with, and one that I'm not comfortable with. So I think the students of it should read them because the ingredients of both of those circumstances are public. They're in the public record if you just read a little bit.

[00:34:14] AH: So you're saying the methodology was the CIA that overthrew Allende. But the reality is that the CIA was not involved or it wasn't involved in the way that people think it was involved.

[00:34:30] JD: 1970, it attempted to organize a coup that failed, right? But it was against his better judgment. And they made that clear. All covert action operations have been approved by the president of the United States. Why wait for someone to point out one that wasn't? All of them are approved in writing after the mid-70s. So the president gave instructions it'd be done, and that fail. And that was a bad covert action operation instigated by the White House. We could talk about Iran contra another White House instigated.

In '73, the military acted independent. The CIA was not involved in the coup plotting with the military people that overthrew the government. We collected intelligence about the military. We supported the opposition. And so it's two qualitative differences. We were not involved in '73.

[inaudible 00:35:22] 70. No one bothered to spend time **[inaudible 00:35:29]**.

[00:35:32] AH: And you were in Santiago at this time?

[00:35:34] JD: Right? It was my first assignment. I arrived in '71. Allende had been elected. But I was also the CIA Task Force. That's a group that's put together, it's not a permanent office, for

a particular period of time for crisis. So I was there as a junior person. And my responsibility was to write up all the cables coming from around the world and get it into a bulletized format that the chief of the task force could take to upstairs or to downtown. And because of that, I have firsthand exposure to the failed coup, and the ingredients that went into that. And I was actually in the office that received the first report about it in the 70s. So there is – My experience on it, it goes beyond just my time there.

[00:36:25] AH: And going from that task force to the CIA Afghan Task Force, could you tell us a little bit more about how you lived through those events? So the Soviet Union invades Afghanistan on Christmas Day in 1879. And then you find yourself basically at the helm when this thing just ran just to the battlefield. So just walk us through that journey and tell our listeners lots about more of that experience.

[00:36:50] JD: So at this time, I was in Latin American, and I was in Argentina, which is noted earlier. And they had a program in Central America, and I had a disagreement, again, on how we were pursuing. I was against the **[inaudible 00:37:06]**. This is part of the Cold War strategy blocked my – But my view was we should be working inside working with the political capabilities. I never saw as viable the building of an army of contras being trained by Argentines and the borders around Nicaragua to change circumstances.

And I've been asked earlier, and I asked for Argentina, because I didn't want to take over the Central American Task Force. They asked me to take it over. And I said, "Look, I'm not comfortable with where we're headed here." They said, "Don't worry. We're okay. We'll accept your different views." I said, "That's great. But I have to execute." They weren't happy with me. So I added enough in Central America. So I decided, "Well, I'll go to the Middle East." And that's a change of pace. So I did. I ended up Iran, the Iran branch, only to find out that the Iran branch is dragged into the arms for hostages, and that the money illegally was diverted into the Central America program. I couldn't get away from it.

But I got a break in '85. They changed out the chief in Islamabad, and they changed out the fellow that was running the Afghan dessert. And what people don't realize is that there was a view and the establishment in Washington that the Mujahideen was losing. You can't beat the

Russians. They're 10 feet tall. Or are we just going to keep bleeding this thing. This doesn't seem to be the right course. Let's give it one more big push.

So the budget tripped. And so I was put in charge of it. And we had to expand and we ran into the problem of supporting 125,000 fighters with Soviet style weapons. You couldn't use our depo and ship out US Army stamp material. And I had to get mules, 9000 mules that I had a march there every year across China, because Tennessee mules, just in case you're not a mule man, don't work in Afghanistan. A lot of people had to learn that the hard way. But we were bogged down because the Russians had put their special forces in and they had put in their counterpart at the time of Blackhawk, hind helicopters. And they suppressed everything. And we had tried Sam's, every type of **[inaudible 00:39:29]** thing. None of them really were very effective.

And then I remember being down in the White House for a mock demonstration. A Stinger missile, it was stunning. They fired to the left and the target is 180 degrees in the right, and it just makes 180 degree turn. It's like wow, heat seeking. And at the meeting I said we ought to have this in the fray. Now what I didn't know is everybody to table but wanting to put it in for one time, but the agency was opposed to it. No one told me that. So I went and said, "Well, let's do it. Next thing you know I'm over the Defense Department asking for the President sign the approval to do that and get this thing **[inaudible 00:40:06]**. And the first, it was fired in September 1986. I think it was a 23rd or somewhere around there. And the first three missiles, the first one – No one knows this, or at least not a lot of people. The first one hit the ground and bounced with \$80,000. And so divine sent us another piece of – I won't use the word, but let's say useless material. But it wasn't that. But the next three hit the targets. We had satellite imagery, and I brought it to the director.

And there was a sense when I was sitting there with them, that that was the end of the war. And the reason it was the end of the war is that helicopters were shot down, is that the Russian started flying so far above the missile that all the other weapons piled in. And I think the Russians went back, because they introduced something, we introduced something more complicated. They introduced something more – So I think it was at that point that Gorbachev thought, "Well, let's cut our losses." So I think it's few times in history where a single weapon has such an impact, not only on a war, I think it had an impact on the Russian thinking not as a

single weapon system, but because of what happened, that they began – What we saw then was the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union. So it's a great historic important. And again, the model was different than some of the models today, which was the Mujahideen – Never get into covert action if you don't have people in the ground that believe in the mission. Don't dabble. Don't give \$50,000 to carry out a billion dollar operation. Have strong allies. We had major allies that helped in that war. Make sure you have bipartisan support, because if you don't, you're going to get wrapped around the axle later on. So there's a whole set of things, which I delineate in the books.

[00:42:03] AH: And for the introduction of the stingers, tell us a little bit more about what that's like to find yourself the head of the Afghan Task Force. How do you deal with all the stresses and strains and worries and so forth? How do you try to affect change on the ground? So for those of us that only have seen that stuff through the movies? What was it like to be Jack Devine in this time period?

[00:42:29] JD: Well, one of the things you said you've seen in the movies and most people refer to Charlie Wilson's war, right? Everybody loves that movie, right? And I knew Charlie well. I traveled with Charlie. And I think people played him as a buffoon, and he really wasn't. He was Annapolis graduate. He was a substantive guy. Genuinely believe in fighting communism, Democrat from Texas. We had dinner in New York at Sparks restaurant, here's a plug for Sparks. But the reason we went there isn't that because the stake – Paul Castellano the head of the mafia, was gunned down at the doorsteps. So Charlie was romantic. He thought, "Let's not go to a stakeout. Let's go to a place where the mafia guy gets killed." So we go and we're sitting there and across the table, and we had our spouses with us. And I left the agency by them. And he reached across the table, friendly arm on arm, "Jack, I know you didn't like the book, but God, you're going to hate the movie." So he knew that I knew that he was very important guy. He was very important down on the hill. But he didn't have a lot to do with how the war was run, how you got the weapons. I mean, he was strong and a very important face on the account. But people need to understand how covert action is really done. It's not a flamboyant congressman with Jody Roberts and a CIA guy running around off the reservation. That isn't how it's done. It was a US government program. And it was under strict guidelines and dozens of analysts and people that understood how to make saddles for mules and the weapon systems and how the fire. None of these things I knew nothing about. The GPS system also went in under my tenure

when no one knew about it. I wasn't smart enough to invest in it. I'd own your station or museum.

But the point is, it takes a lot of people. And if I ever get a chance like today, people like maybe get associated with it, and then people throw flowers on you or mud, depending on which issue it is. But one of the key people in these they don't make good movie material. They're logs people, logistic people. How do you get these weapons? It's such dedicated people that can do – Think of how you ship out. How do you get weapons? Get them on boats and Toyota trucks. And I would be brief. The next thing you know, we'd have 100 trucks. So you don't get that in a movie, and it doesn't make for – A lot of people sitting around, “Well, how many rounds of ammunition? And this, and that, and the analysis process.

But I don't want them to think that you could just do this stuff on a whim. You have to have plumbing put in, and it takes time. And maybe plumbing doesn't work, so you don't do it. So I think I want to capture that, and **[inaudible 00:45:23]** who is the chief in Islamabad, a great officer. Wrote a cable, and I was in Rome at the time. The Russians had just left on the bridge. And he sent out a cable saying, “We won.” Okay? But whether you call it winning, I mean, certainly, from my perspective, I think the Russian saw it that way. The word is we. And that meant it's a collective, organized, thoughtful part – It's one of the better examples of covert action.

But if you're giving out medals, I got a whole list of people that are totally unrecognized, never won a medal. Don't care about a medal. And I casually mentioned the saddle maker, because I was interviewed by a fellow on a radio and said, “You don't know me, but I was down in Central America. They came to me because I know how to make saddles. And I made some of those saddles.” So whoever know, right? So my point was – The movie is good. It makes Charlie look good, and so on. But this is serious business, the whole businesses. People's lives are on the line. If you look at it, part of the problem there was the hubris that John Kennedy read through many of the Ian Fleming's books. You have to have a sense of restraint. And this goes to the spymaster's mentality, the prism. You have to have a hard edge about not what you want, but what do you want, but what's realistic. What can get done?

So your point about how did it play out? I think it's in that context that that I would focus, and actually my message is this is serious stuff. And it's not to be used on all occasions by any stretch of the imagination. There are places today where people would like to have a regime change. You better take a really serious look at what the prospects are before you start dabbling, right? And out of desperation. Sometimes they turn to the agency in desperation. And the agency has a tradition of can do. I can do it. I can do it. And you have to slow that down sometimes. So do we want to do it? Can we do it? And then there's a point of courage.

When you don't think it can be done, like that fellow down in Santiago, who I have great regard with. You take a pen and you're right and say, "It won't work." And then it's up to the policymakers to take the responsibilities and say should.

[00:47:57] AH: and if any listeners have never seen Stinger missile launcher, we have one here at the museum.

[00:48:05] JD: Well, Charlie Wilson had one in his office was that he said it, because he'd ever had a thing to do with it. Actually, at one point, it wasn't his fault that others that although go nameless, tell the Pakistanis to tell the Americans you don't want it in the fray out there. So Charlie was trying to be helpful, but he had nothing to do with the stinger. And whatever reason, somebody felt he ought to have it hanging in his office. So you're kind of – Well, you don't have it because Charlie's, sadly, has passed on, because he was a very special person in congress that there are fewer of the Charlie Wilsons. I'm not talking about his flamboyant party life, but his sense of dedication to this country and taking the course of action that's best for the country, and not worrying too much about his particular district on that issue.

[00:49:02] AH: At the end of that movie, it goes forward to the post 9/11 period and then there's the whole part about was a great operation during the 80s, but we have thought the end game. I wondered what your thoughts were when you watch that, or what your view is on the thesis of –

[00:49:23] JD: I think it's quite to the contrary. And again, another place where the story is wrong. Charlie and I actually agreed as the war was coming to an end. And we'd lost – We were going to use money to try and do nation building, covertly and overtly in Afghanistan. And a number of my colleagues and others said, "Now, it isn't going to make a difference." So I always

felt or for several years, that there was a missed opportunity. But I would tell you looking with hindsight, it wasn't a missed opportunity. And one of the refinements in my view on covert action, you can't force feed democracy. You can't force feed communism, if you want me to give advice to my friends again.

The point was, when we left, people in Afghanistan had to want a different approach. And we should not – We certainly shouldn't use covert means to help force feed democracy and bring about change. It's the first mistake you make when you go into a country and you think you want to do something. So they change their ways. You really need to work with it. When you find somebody that's in trouble, and shares a common interest and willing to put their life on the line, then you have a place for covert action. So I think I was wrong. It wouldn't have mounted to anything. History would have played out pretty much the way it did.

[00:50:59] AH: Tell us about more about Iran Contra. That must have been an interesting time to have been involved in all of that.

[00:51:06] JD: I think it's one of the great stories of how things go wrong. It's one if you're looking at a bad case of covert action. But it starts with the best of motives. There was a CIA officer, great officer, in Lebanon who is kidnapped, viciously tortured and murdered by the Hezbollah. They sent tapes back. And the director of CIA, Bill Casey, and the president of the United States sat and had to watch those tapes. And I think they were so searingly painful that their mindset was we have to do everything on the face the earth to get him out and get all other hostages out. But there was a policy, long standing, because a lot of terrorism in the 70s, and we developed the policy that was you can't negotiate with them, because they're going to kidnap another person, replace it. We have to have a policy telling kidnappers, America is not going to deal with you. Otherwise, you're going to have more.

So that was the policy, and they decided to change that policy. They decided that they would look for other avenues. But then the White House had a contractor who came forward with an arms merchant, who I go into in my book. And there was a thick file. When I took over the branch, they gave me a file saying, "Here's the guy's file. We have burned notices out telling the world never use him. He's a total fabricator." But the White House believed in the guy, brought him to the agency's attention. I'm on record saying not that I arranged to have him polygraphed,

but I go into this detail, which we can't do today. And he failed every question. So the operational director was supposed to be totally out of it. And this was in December, when I thought I killed it, which George Schultz says that expression, no bad idea dies in Washington. And this is a classic example of it. So I thought it was dead. And the head of the Middle East came to me and I came. He called me and I went to see him. And he said, "I'm not going to like this. You don't have to deal with the arms merchant."

So they said, "Jack, you're not going to like this, but we organized the flights." I never dreamed the flights would take off the ground. I thought it was a bad idea. And I was amazed. Very brave. The people [inaudible 00:53:28]. And one of my colleagues, they got on a plane. McFarlane, head of the NSC, and flew to Iran. I don't think they knew where they were going. I didn't think they knew they were going to meet. I mean, an amazing thing. There were three hostages that were released not too long after, but another three were kidnapped not too long after. The missiles were sold in a very inflated price. I was getting the money, but I wasn't seeing the second stream of money. And that went to Central America. And that's where Congress had passed the law, no money to Central America.

And when that happened, you then had a violation of law. And that was the president witting, was the director witting, big trials, congress, a tremendously powerful moment in politics in Washington. And again, when I look at it, it was ill conceived, executed. But the thing that is unique about this, because I can't think of another case where part of what we had been authorized to do included money – Not money, breaking of the law. So I know of no covert action that was taken independently of approval by the president of United States. And this part, the president also can't approve something that's a violation of congressional law. This was a violation and it's a unique thing in history. And it's important to read how good people, nothing in it for them, but the good of the country, can wander down a bad path in the covert action arena. It really is an area that those who get into it can do, want to be helpful, let's get it done, need to reflect on the entire scope of what is covert action. Does it apply in this case? And that's the teacher in me speaking anybody that will listen.

[00:55:27] AH: You were involved in so many interesting covert actions. What are some of the lessons you've learned? I realized this could easily be a whole podcast then of itself, but just give our listeners lots of bits of your wisdom.

[00:55:43] JD: Well, let me give tribute to the wisdom of 13th century philosophers, right? And that is you need to have a national security threat. They phrase that differently. You need to try it all other means to prevent the problem. You need to be – Proportionality. You can't spend \$50 billion and kill 100,000 people to save one person. So there's proportionality. Really important, maybe the second thing. You have to have a realistic – You have a moral responsibility. Realistic chance of prevailing. You don't go in and say, "Well, let's give it the college try." And I think the protection of the innocence, and that's the way it's phrased in the 13th century. What they mean is collateral damage. Don't go in and ruin an entire country to solve a minor problem. Then you get to the Jack Devine rules, whether it is wisdom or not, I'll just say you should well take advice on this. Make sure there's bipartisan support down the hill, right? Make sure it's properly funded, that you have allies. These are things that philosophers weren't thinking about, right?

But all of the others, all these other considerations I think are fundamental to evaluating going forward. And you have the people on the ground that really want to do it, and have the capability to do it. And the agency has to have his team and its allies and Special Forces ready to go and prepared, and all that is well within our grasp.

[00:57:25] AH: Tell us a little bit more about the title of your book, and how covert action fits within that?

[00:57:31] JD: Well, I think the title really refers to the Spymaster, in this case, me, and how I look at the world, and how I looked at intelligence operations and how they are done. But in this particular book, it's about how the Russians have done the operations. How we countered with them. And it's seated with real spy cases. And what I tried to do, as I said earlier, is go back and forth between then and now. And to point out the lessons and things that are quite different.

There's another part of spy mastering, which is how do you run an agent? How do you recruit an agent? What's your counterintelligence? How do you communicate with an agent, right? We're talking today about the action part. But there's an espionage part. That tends not to have the same ethical, political angst. People will accept the fact that spying has been with us a long time. And it usually is not. It's rare to see a spy case become a political football in Washington. It's almost always to cover action. So I do spend time on both aspects and try and weave it

together. Because in order to have good covert action, you have to have agents, and you have to have people that can tell you what's the best way to push what button.

So I tried to get – But there are two disciplines. And I tried to meld them and the reading of the book, and give it both the historic and contemporary feel up to **[inaudible 00:59:07]** and up to President Biden.

[00:59:10] AH: And another aspect of the profession is counterintelligence. So I know that you knew Rick Ames. Could you tell us how you knew him? What you thought about him, and where you were when the story dropped.

[00:59:24] JD: I knew Rick almost from the day I walked in the building. He and I were – I was doing Eastern Europe, almost analytical, lowest end of analytical. Identifying cables and taking the names out and putting the file on. He was doing Russia. And I got to know him. I went to his wedding. He was an agency brat. As I told you, I didn't even have anybody in US government. His father was a spy. Not a spy, a CIA operator, not very effective. In fact, his file, somehow Rick got to read it and it was disheartened to see that the father was viewed about the same way he was viewed. But he knew the spy, but he lived in Bangkok with his father and was a reader of spy books and gave me one of his favorites, Eric Ambler's, one of his novels. *A Coffin for Demetrius* was the title. I gave him one on the psychopathology of leadership. I think I should have given – Really implies psychopathology of a trader. How do you look at people and what makes them tick?

So I went to his wedding, but we separate it, but he was very much a diehard American patriot. Okay? But then I didn't see him for 25 years. And I saw him once – Because I went abroad. He was abroad. Never saw me. Sort of keep track of people's career. Was going alright, but nothing spectacular. But when I got to Rome, he was there. He was already assigned there. We got reacquainted. But the problem was I think he thought we were going to be friends again. I mean, not friends, but he would have leeway. And he had a drinking problem that they brought him back and then dry them out and set him out. Because the CIA really believes that dealing with alcoholic problems, because firstly humanitarian aspect of it, but you want people to feel that they can step up and, "Look. I got a problem." You get it under control. And then you go back. In other words, your career is not ruined. You want to keep people in the system.

So he came back. And first day was in, and wasn't a particularly nice discussion. I said, "Rick, you had a drinking problem. If I encountered you're drinking too much, you're going to leave." And then I called the deputy and they say keep an eye on him, because he was in a different part of the building. I got to know him. And there was an interesting incident that stuck in my mind with Rick. We actually had a Bulgarian come in and volunteer the work for CIA. And Rick was the Russia guy. So we took him out. And he took them out in the weekend to be tested for polygraph. When I came in the office that day, I ran into the polygrapher and I said, "How did it go?" He said, "Oh, that was terrible, wants it done seven times. We couldn't make any sense out of it."

So I was very angry, because once you retest a couple of times – So what Rick was doing was deliberately retesting so that you would have a blurred chart. I don't want to say charged down a hole. But all six, five, and they got about three inches from a nose. And I told him what I thought about it. He didn't say a word. It was no explanation. But he didn't try and defend himself. He didn't try and push back as most people would. And I just – There's a net Spanish word, oho, like look out. And I had this sense. It was a strange reaction. But it didn't mean he was a traitor. Just when there's a strangeness in his mind.

So if you fast forward when they were hunting for him, I was back in Washington, and they asked for a private meeting, confidential one, they said, "Well, we're looking for a spy. Do you think Rick Ames could be a spy?" And I said, "Look, I know thousands of people over the years." I don't know what I would say. The answer is yes. This is the only one.

And the only reason I can tell you that is when you ask, I get this flashback. There is something about that mindset that I think he qualified. But the truth of the matter is when you looked at Ames, and you see this pattern in many spies, he had a very big ego in terms of how good he thought he was. He thought he understood. I mean, I took it in stride when I first met him. I didn't see it as a huge ego. I just saw a guy who knows a lot about the spy business. And he's passing it on to somebody, a neophyte, and I was welcome for the information. But what happened is he had this vague idea of how smart he was. But he was lazy, and he didn't work hard. And so you can be smart, you can be talented. But if you're lazy, you get a gap, you get a gap between yourself opinion and what's happening to your career. And when you get that, and this is no

matter what country you're in, when you have that gap, it's in that area they get disaffection. And it's not about some ideological capitalism versus communism. It's really very personal.

And so I think it was in that space that he was tormented, and had unusual unique access. The gods were not lined up on this one. The best access that he could have if you wanted a spy inside CIA and you got him at a point in his marriage where he needed money. Everyone else thought he had money from her. Turns out she didn't have. Her family had money. At the end, he sat outside the Russian embassy and had several drinks and then walked in. And he had a natural reason for walking in, because as a CIA, Russian expert working – The FBI knows, of course, he's going in. And it didn't raise a red flag. And he thought he could control the Russians. He'd give him a couple tidbits. And they played him like a violin, because his self-esteem – And didn't mean he was a good operator. And the Russians played to that ego. They spotted it a very good case officer on their side, worked it. And he came back into the embassy in a second meeting and gave them the big dump, it's called. And he gave him the names of 11 Russians working for the CIA inside of Moscow, and all of them are executed.

There was a TV – There are not many interviews with Rick. There's one by a woman I can't remember which famous interviewer was doing the job. And she, out of nowhere, asked the question, "Rick, do you have trouble sleeping at night?" And his answer was a momentary hesitation "I thought I would, but I didn't." And that's a psychopath. You're talking about 11 people lost their lives, dedicated people, principle people, you were an employee of the CIA. You can rationalize that any way you want. But that's a psychopath. So it's in the mind. The second thing is how do you find spies? And there're all types of rule, I mean, principles.

And when Rick was arrested, and I was chief of Latin America at that time, and the worst thing is have somebody you know become defined as a spy. It really ruins your day. So everybody around the building started wearing badges never again. Someone handed about. It was a brilliant idea. The only problem was, by the time they hand them out, I was now upstairs as the associate. Number two in terms of worldwide operations. And I knew there was a spy. We thought it was in CIA. It turned out to be in the FBI. It was Robert Hanson. And we went looking for him. So I was never going to wear that hippocratic badge.

And the truth of matters is there's probably always a spy. My friends in the CIA won't like to hear this. It's part of the business. And you always must be alert. It must be counter-intelligence. The fact the never been ever again. You can't come up with enough forums, enough interviews. And the way most spies are really caught over and over again, and this speaks to the need for offensive CI. It's usually another spy in the opposing service that comes out and says you have a problem.

[01:07:35] AH: Any regrets about your career.

[01:07:38] JD: And one of the things we talked about at the very beginning is when I look back at my career, I really felt somehow I was in a unique business that wasn't for everybody, but my DNA fit. And I believed in the mission. And I would say anybody that go into CIA, don't pretend. Don't go because you're James Bond or want to see the world. You really have the sense of mission, because there are real day-to-day sacrifices.

So I think, in my career, I felt I did well with the help of a lot of people mentoring and so on. And I think I ended up doing the types of things that I wanted to do. I've talked about some of those areas, and particularly around contra, where I found troublesome. But even there, and even ains, in a way, I'm wiser, let me put it that way. You know more about life. You know more about the business because you've rubbed up against the bad. So I think my career was a very lucky career. And there may be an event here, an event there that I wish didn't happen. But in the collective, I'm extraordinarily satisfied.

I also felt, again, this sense of mission, that what I was doing was meaningful. And that it didn't violate the core principles that I think are important. And I think you have to have that piece or you're going to have a very rocky career. I think there are probably a couple places Iran contra I thought I spoke up. I thought I really did a job in stopping it. I was a junior person. But I also thought it wasn't going to happen. So I would say a regret might have been maybe I was speaking a loud voice, but perhaps I should have shouted from the rooftops, right? But I didn't know enough. And I didn't have George Schultz's sense of this could really happen. And I learned a lesson. But that's a different kind of regret. You sometimes worry about your family. Did you shortchange them by yanking around the world? And at least two or three times in my life I've sort of addressed it with my children. They're adults now. And they tell me the same

thing. We wouldn't change it for anything. There were indeed sacrifices. And I don't know whether they want to make me happy, which you always want your children to do. But I believe them. I believe that on balance, it was a really good thing. But it's one thing to be yanked out of high school and shifted around. And they took the right path on it. And even some of the risk in Chile, I probably would have thought differently if I wasn't so new to the business of the risk that my family were at. So it's in that realm that's not in the realm of mission, jobs done.

[01:10:34] AH: I think the final question is, remember, when you said that the CIA had held on to your application to join, I wondered if you had a copy of that, if it was the –

[01:10:47] JD: Well, there are two reasons I'm not giving you. One, it would immediately dispel any hope that someone was going to find a good writer. So I hope I've learned something over the 30 years or so. That witty and flowing right, it was really sort of – Well, I had a master's degree. It wasn't without some writing skill. But it was – It didn't get into why I thought. It was just, "Hey, this sounds like a great thing today. How about joining the CIA?" And, also, showing you the letter. As I said, look, it was good enough to get me moved on to the next place. But I thought I really blew his socks off, because that's where I got there. And so it's a little – It's sobering. And it's good. It keeps your feet squarely planted around, although I married a woman that has kept my feet on the ground, because she'll remind me when I think I've – Writing the book was painful at times, because she would say, "You sound like a jerk." And you'd go off and you pout and you come back and you read it, "I do. That's terrible." Then rewrite it. So there you have it.

[01:11:54] AH: Well, it's been fantastic to talk to you, Jack. And I look forward to seeing you next week here at the museum.

[01:12:01] JD: I look forward to being there. And you've been very good to me. And I've been impressed with the museum. And both the way it's structured. And it's just amazing how it's grown in importance. And, at first, I didn't realize the impact, but part of what my writing is about is trying to get people to understand the business. But another really good way is if you go to the museum and you really studiously look at it. There's a story being told. And then there's a great bookstore you don't want to miss out.

[01:12:31] AH: And then at bookstore, you can pick up copies of Spymaster's Prism.

[01:12:35] JD: Some tell me to sign copies of it.

[01:12:38] AH: Signed copies, exactly. Okay, Jack. Well, thanks ever so much for your time.

[01:12:43] JD: Thank you.

[END]