

EPISODE 474

[00:00:00] A: Want to dig into your career a little bit more and see what we can uncover? So I think an interesting place to start maybe is I know that you're an Asia expert. So tell us how did you first get interested in this huge and important region of the world?

[00:00:17] MP: I grew up in Phoenix, Arizona. Believe it or not, there was a sizable Asian-American community there, especially Japanese-Americans and Chinese-Americans. And I went to school with these kids, I play at their houses, and I go over there and they have these kind of strange pictures of relatives and an artwork. And it was just always kind of intriguing to me.

Actually, my mother had a role in it too. She's from Norway. But when I was like 12, she bought me a small little book, which I still have of Chinese landscape paintings. And I looked at that. It was just kind of a fascinating vision for me. So I guess I'm a romantic at heart. The Mystic Orient always had its attraction for me, as a boy, probably in high school, 12, 13 or something. When the atmosphere was right, you could actually get West Coast radio stations on your little clock radio by your bed. And KSFO in San Francisco had a program on Friday or Saturday nights, whatever. It started about 11 o'clock midnight. That was actually sponsored by Pan Am, Pan Am Airways. And so they play light classical music. But in between, you were on Pan Am clipper one. And they talked about flying from San Francisco to Honolulu, and Honolulu to Guam. And it just was all very romantic. And I loved it.

When I started college – So I had this interest. When I started college, I was going to be a lawyer, okay? Everybody that's in political science is going to be a lawyer, and I was going to be a lawyer. And I was working my way through college. I needed a poli-sci course that started very early in the morning, like 7:30 or so. So coming by job by noon, and the only thing that was being offered at Arizona State where I was going was a course that was in government of communist Asia. And the professor, Dr. Joe, a Korean-American, became a mentor of mine. I got very interested and I took everything they had there. That led, I guess, over the next couple of years to a master's in Asian studies and eventually they're into intelligence.

[00:02:14] A: I know that there was a there was a detour on there. You find yourself in Vietnam.

[00:02:20] MP: What happened was I was going to be a college professor and decided wasn't going to be a lawyer. I was going to study Chinese government, Chinese language and whatnot. And Dr. Joe helped me get a grant to the East West Center in Honolulu. And that was a joint program at that point with State Department and University of Hawaii. And the idea was to take about 300 Americans, and maybe 900 Asians, and we'd be in a special school, and they would teach us to be Asian experts, and teach the Asians to understand the United States and that sort of thing.

So I was getting a Master's, and halfway through that, I got drafted. So I did two years in the Army, a year in Vietnam as an NCO in the infantry. And by the time I got back on campus, I really couldn't see myself being a college professor. And so I needed to take another job. I need to find a job. And so I took the State Department exam, I passed that, and I was waiting around to hear what the next steps were when a friend of mine who had been an Air Force intelligence in Thailand came up to me and said, "Marty, there's these other guys you need to talk to?" I said, "What are you talking about?" And he says, "It's CIA." He says, "I think they be interested in somebody like you. Let me put you together with a contact," and one thing led to another.

So from there, I made contact. They called me. I went through the interview process, and I ultimately got offered a job and went. So I need to say thank you, Ralph. You know who you are. I don't think I ever thanked you. But if you're listening to this, you know that you're the one that helped me make that very important decision.

[00:03:53] A: And I want to come back to your career in CIA later. Part of the reason why I wanted to discuss that was I wondered if your time in Vietnam intersected with your interest in Asia.

[00:04:06] MP: I never thought that my first Asian experience would be in a combat zone when I started the master's program in Chinese history and whatnot. I knew that when I got out of the army and I wasn't going to be a college professor, I still have the great interest in Asia, had served there. I got to know some of the people there a little bit. Tremendously respecting the culture and what they were going through and whatnot. And I knew I wanted to use that expertise. And so as I began to look at job opportunities that weren't going to lead me down the

academic road, certainly State Department was the first thing that occurred to me. I took a look at possibly journalism. And then Ralph turned up in my life and that guided me that way.

China was always my passion. Throughout my career, I worked on all of Asia, Southeast Asia for a while. A lot of work on Japan and Korea, but China was my passion. It's still my – I guess it's my hobby. I try and follow it from a distance.

[00:05:10] A: Just to finish off on your experience in Vietnam.

[00:05:13] MP: I didn't fit in. I was a little bit older. Okay? Matter of fact, I went through basic training. Everybody got orders at the end of basic training, except for me. They didn't know what to do with me. You would go on to another school or something. They sent me home for a week. When I came back to this basic training company I was in and found out that I was now the clerk in charge of running basic training. So I was basically radar O'Reilly. And my experience in Vietnam, I was with the Adjutant General Corps. We did a lot of investigations into various issues, some of them very serious. Had a little time on the line, not a lot. But it made me feel for the people. Understand what they were going through, and what Americans were going through as well too.

[00:06:01] A: Tell us a little bit more about the interest that you have.

[00:06:05] MP: Again, I said it was a kind of a romantic interest to start with, and then it became an academic interest. So I started as a young China analyst. I'm a young China political analyst at CIA working on internal politics. That led eventually to overseas posting that dealt with China for the agency. So I spent a couple of years living in an Asian environment. And it's kind of deepened my appreciation and understanding. Even today, I do a lot of reading on Asia and China. My passion, actually, if I've got one, is kind of the history of Shanghai as a city from 1840 to 1951. Sitting here in my office, I think long one wall or list of books and that sort of thing. It must be 250 books or something, memoirs and stuff on Shanghai. It was a very, very interesting period. Very important period for the development of Chinese nationalism and Chinese history and the interplay between East and West. The history is not always – Generally is not a very happy or pleasant one. But I just find it a fascinating thing and study.

[00:07:12] A: And I don't know when the last time was you were at the Spy Museum, but we've actually got a knife that belonged to **[inaudible 00:07:21]** fighting knife **[inaudible 00:07:25]** policeman in Shanghai. Right?

[00:07:27] MP: Right, right. And he chained the OSS. One of the books on my wall back here is his memoir.

[00:07:33] A: Oh, wow! Okay. Well, we got his knife. Help us understand what it was like to be you in 1989. So I'm not talking about the fall of the Berlin Wall. I'm talking about Tiananmen Square. Because I know that that was quite a big moment in the history of modern China. Sketch a note for us. Where were you? What were you doing? How did you experience and lived through this event?

[00:07:58] MP: Yeah. Well, I was actually the Deputy Director of the Office of East Asian Analysis, which is responsible for all the analysis on Asia. I just completed a rotational assignment in the Office of Training and Education trying to develop analytic training courses and tradecraft. I did that for a year. And I came back. And the first day I'm back in was Tiananmen.

For our listeners, there's kind of a long convoluted walk up to that that I'm not going to go through. But needless to say, that when Deng Xiaoping really began to consolidate his reforms and move China in the direction that it's still moving today, although under different leadership, it created a lot of issues. It created a lot of social tensions. It created a lot of opportunities. But there was also dissent within the party, with the military. People were getting richer, some are getting poor, and whatnot. Okay, all this continues to bubble along.

One of the men that was most active and interested in political reform as well as economic reform, which is what Deng was principally interested in, was a man named Hu Yaobang. And through the course of advanced about four or five years, six years before Tiananmen, he was purged from the party. There was a falling out. But he was sort of a hero to the youth.

When he died on April 15, 1989, there was a spontaneous demonstration in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, literally tens of thousands of people gathered. They started laying reefs and that sort

of thing. The party was very disturbed, very worried about this. At the same time, it's important to remember that communism was collapsing in Eastern Europe. So this is sort of very frightening to them. And over the course of about a month and a half, there were several interactions between the students and the leadership, all of which were handled badly. Students ratcheted up, the tensions with a hunger strike. Leadership decided they needed to do something. Finally, in May, Deng Xiaoping orders martial law, orders troops into the square. Thousands die. We don't know to this day how many. The Tiananmen demonstrations were crushed.

Now, what was significant about this is there was a lot of media contact going on at that time. They were looking at Eastern Europe and applying it to China. And so there was a lot of commentary about maybe this is the end of the regime. This is true democracy coming in. That sort of thing. Those of us on the intelligence side had a very different view. We were saying from day one it's going to end badly if the students don't get out of the square. This is a regime that will not hesitate to use violence, because they see this as a direct and deep security threat.

This was the George Herbert Walker Bush administration. President Bush, who had been director of CIA, Ambassador to China, UN Ambassador. I think his status is going to go up as a president over the years, his handling of the collapse of the Soviet Union and all of that. That administration also, I think, initially believed that perhaps there was a happy ending to this. And one of the things we were able to do as intelligence analysts is convince them that we didn't think so. And so their focus changed. It changed from kind of watching event, to beginning to think how are we going to protect the Americans in China and in Beijing, and that sort of thing? What challenges is this going to present for the United States and our China relationship and that sort of thing? It was a tragedy for the Chinese students. I think it's a turning point in modern Chinese history in part, because I think it makes it much more difficult for any kind of political reform to happen down the way. But it was also a very important victory, a term I use, with big quotations mark, around intelligence analysis, because we were able to focus administration on the issues that they should have been focused on and they were able to do quite a bit to protect Americans as a result.

[00:12:00] A: Was there anything that surprising to you? Did it go the way that you thought it was going to go?

[00:12:06] MP: We saw the tensions building within the leadership for a long time, back to '79. I mean, we had pretty good insights into tensions and that sort of thing. The party itself, Desh was clearly making the decisions. He was the guy in charge. But there were factions within the party. There was kind of a liberal faction identified with Hu Yaobang. It was a more conservative faction that identified with the party elders. The military weren't particularly happy, because one of the deals that Deng made as he pushed his economic reforms. Was telling the military, "Look, you're not going to benefit from this immediately. We're going to build the economy. We're going to get this thing running right? And about 10 years, then you're going to start seeing investment in military things." So there was a lot of grumping going along then.

The Gang of Four were gone. But then they had another crisis with what they call the Little Gang of Four. And so we're track charting all of this. So we knew the tensions were there. We saw the pressures building in society. We had pretty good access to segments of Chinese society. The bilateral relationship was pretty good. So our diplomats were out talking to people. Military attachés were out talking to people. The media was more open. It was still controlled. A lot of interaction with Hong Kong. People going in and out, able to observe. We felt like we had a pretty good grip on what the dynamic was.

There's always a question, of course, "Well, how's it going to play out?" There was actually a point I think, probably late April, when there was a chance for it to all cooldown. Students leave the square. And then there would have been quiet arrests and the rest of it, but partly through the mishandling of the party, partly through actions by the students, tensions did not ratchet down. They ratcheted it up. And that ultimately led to the confrontation.

[00:13:57] A: Given your lifelong interest and passion for China. I feel like it would be a missed opportunity if I didn't ask you what your current take is on China, US-Chinese relations, and just the whole geopolitics of the Asia Pacific region. Small subject, I know.

[00:14:18] MP: Well, I think I'm concerned by what I see happening there. Every administration, going back probably to Jimmy Carter, and I actually came on duty in Nixon 1. Has always said, we have to pay more attention to Asia. We're going to pivot toward Asia. I once had a young analyst asked me, "Marty, do you think this administration is really going to pivot to Asia?" I said,

“Yes, they’re going to pivot to Asia. But what you got to remember is there's an off-ramp to the Middle East.” They never seem to get there.

And as I look at China, and as I look at Asia right now, I think in the simplest terms, China is challenging the United States. Challenging the United States not only for leadership in the region. But if you take a look at what they're doing with some of the other things, you could probably expand that to a global challenge as well. People with a long history, a long memory, they talked about a century of humiliation. That is over. China has stood up. They're going to resume, not a new place in the world, but their rightful place in the world. And their rightful place in the world is China as the Middle Kingdom. I truly believe they think that. And Asia ought to be pivoting around what Beijing thinks. It's not a puppet relationship. But if you're in Tokyo, or Seoul or Hanoi or someplace else, before you engage in any activities with the United States or others, you better think seriously about whether or not Beijing would be happy with that.

If you take a look at the recent talks in Alaska, I think they were very chilling. This is a leadership in Beijing that I think is aggressive. They're arrogant, and they're prone to push. Now, every new administration **[inaudible 00:16:06]**, including back to the Reagan administration, the Chinese, generally within the first six months, and it's true this time, has found some way to challenge the United States particularly on the One China policy. Whether it's over arms sales to Taiwan, or the P3 incident with Bush 43 or something. So maybe what we're seeing in Alaska, it's just typical behavior. But I do think there's more behind it than that. I think there's more of a determination, more of a plan than there was before.

Now, I don't move in policy circles anymore, Andrew. But if I did, and I were asked, “What should we do?” And I've given a fair amount of thought to this. I'd say, “Well, look, Mr. President, Mr. National Security Adviser. Mr. Secretary of State, or whoever, I think you have to start by asking and then answering three questions. The first is what kind of relationship do you want with China? And it can't be something like cooperative and peaceful. It's got to be something specific. Exactly what are you looking for in that relationship? The second question is tougher. What Chinese actions are acceptable or unacceptable to us? How much of an issue do we want to make of Hong Kong, or **[inaudible 00:17:27]**, or human rights? I, for one, I'm deeply concerned about Beijing cyber activities. I'm also concerned about aggressive behavior towards

Taiwan and in the South China Sea. And I'm not advocating drawing a red line or something like that. But we've got to sit down and decide what we can live with and what we can't live with.

The third question is, and I think this is really critical too, is what can we do to strengthen our relations with our allies and partners in Asia? And I really do think that that's diplomatic and it's military as well. Certainly, at the top of the list is Australia, Japan, South Korea. Have to do some hard thinking about Taiwan, particularly given Beijing's actions, and Vietnam, as well too. It's easy for me to pose those questions. Answering them, of course, cuts across a lot of interests. Not only just foreign policy interests, but US economic interests, domestic politics, priorities, and there're tradeoffs and all of those. So they're easy questions to ask, but the hard ones to answer, particularly when you got to navigate politics to get there as well.

[00:18:43] A: I just want to go back on a couple of things you said. For our listeners that aren't up with us, what are the talks in Alaska and what just happened? Just a brief summary?

[00:18:54] MP: Well, apparently, there was supposed to be a getting to know you session. And all I know is what little I've seen in the press. My understanding is a national security adviser and the Secretary of State went in and did kind of a brief presentation, very diplomatic and that sort of thing. And their Chinese counterpart went into a **[inaudible 00:19:13]** far longer than it was supposed to, basically accused the US of human rights violations. Saying that our model of democracy is no longer applicable to most of the world. And I guess if I boil it down to a sentence, the takeaway would be you're the past. We're the future. You just got to live with it.

[00:19:38] A: What are the drivers of China's foreign policy as a Communist Party doctrine? As a muscular nationalism? Or is it just good old fashioned power politics?

[00:19:50] MP: A mix of the last two. It's a Communist Party, but they're not practicing it. Okay? If they were, they'd be a lot less trouble actually. Maybe we want to encourage them to go in direction? I don't know. I think the leadership has a dilemma. Their ability to rule as a single party and to have no opposition rests on three pillars. One is we're communist. We're the future. History is going our way. The second is we're providing for the economic welfare of the Chinese people. The third is we're protecting Chinese interests and reestablishing China's rightful place in the world.

Well, the communism pillar is gone. They're doing great economically. But there're a lot of people out there that are more expert than I am that they think they're on a bubble. And certainly, there're a lot of issues with climate, distribution of wealth, markets in Asia and whatnot. So maybe economy goes on forever, maybe it doesn't. But that leaves the third one, protecting and projecting China as a world leader.

And if you go back to kind of classic Chinese foreign policy, it was the old tribute system. So the idea was the Emperor sat in Beijing. And there were all these other little states all around China. They would always look to China. They would come to Beijing. They would offer gifts. The Emperor would say thank you and he would give them greater gifts, and then they would go away. But China was kind of the center of the world until it all collapsed in the 1840s, 1830s, 1840s and on forward.

So they see themselves as natural leaders. And China has never been aggressive, territorial aggressive power, although, certainly you're going to get an argument in Xinjiang. You're going to get an argument in Tibet in a lot of other places. But basically, what they mostly relied on is knowledge or acknowledgement of their superiority and their right to lead. And originally, that was Asia. And I think increasingly, they see themselves in a global role in that matter, okay? And I think probably the perceive, as a lot of others do, a certain weakness in the United States over the last 10, 15, 20 years, whatever. And it's not just the last administration. It goes back before that, that maybe we can be had, if not militarily, at least in a global leadership sense.

[00:22:33] A: I don't want to be too inside baseball, but it seems to me that if you look at contemporary China, nothing would more accurately foretell the dissolution of the current party than a Marxist analysis, because the economic basis of production is now completely out of kilter with the political superstructure. And then Marxism, economics drives politics, right?

[00:22:59] MP: Yeah. Yeah. It was interesting. When Deng started pushing his reforms in the late 70s, early 80s, and he was really taking them in this direction, the black cat, white cat. Who cares what color the cat is? As long as it catches mice is the old Chinese saying. A lot in the party didn't want to go forward. They actually wanted to go back. They wanted to go back to the early years of the regime. So '49, to '53, '55. Everything before the great leap when things really

started going off the tracks and Mao started pushing his extreme agendas that ultimately led to the Cultural Revolution and all the other issues. So this leadership is really brought into the Western economic model, although they will not tell you that. And they're pretty darn good at it.

[00:23:53] A: And just one more question on China, then we'll come back to your career in the CIA, which is really rich and varied. And I really want to make sure that we have some time for that. So the final question on China is how much as the current regime antagonistically opposed to democracy as a system of government? Is it just a case of, "We don't really care what your system of government is. If you let us do what we want to do, then we'll work with you."

[00:24:25] MP: We don't like democracy for us. Okay, us being China in that sense. How you want to rule? I think in their heart of hearts, we don't care. As long as you recognize our pride of place and don't create problems for us going where we want to go. So unlike you're going to deal with common term or whatever. I don't think they're on a crusade to replace democracy with socialism or communism and advanced to a worker's paradise, or whatever. It just doesn't. It just doesn't figure in that.

What they are arguing in their competition for global leadership is that your model, the United States, doesn't work anymore. That worked really well post World War Two, last century. But look at the mess you're in now. And look at us. Our model of – I don't know what it is, status capitalism communism with a Marxist overlay and toast on the side or something. You got to be taking your lead from us. And certainly when you see the One Belt and the One Road program, they're are working very hard to propagate the notion that their model for development and their model of rule is one that would work best for most other place.

[00:25:49] A: It doesn't necessarily have to be worried about China propagating a communist ideology and where it's engaging around the world. It's not like the Soviet Union and Angola and Mozambique or something.

[00:26:02] MP: No. No. I don't see it that way. I'm kind of out of touch. But I see it more like China has stood up. We need to be recognized as maybe the largest economy in the world. Certainly one of the biggest military powers of the world. And we need to be treated accordingly.

And our views ought to be respected as a result. And if you don't want to do that, then you have to realize that there's going to be certain consequences for antagonizing Beijing.

[00:26:37] A: It was really great to talk to you last Friday when you were out in your back garden with a cigar and a martini. And we've reached a point in the interview where it's time to grab the martini. And get the cigar cutter out. So I wonder if we could look back to your career in CIA. And two things that I want to particularly focus on as moments where your Asia expertise or passion were used, and then your leadership, and whether it be in terms of rising to become the third most powerful figure in CIA, or whether it be as a mentor to people like Mike Morrell, or whether it be just training analysts. So a lot of analysts that are out there, you will have some impact on their career. So I wonder if we could just go back to you've joined the CIA. Like walk us through the rest of your journey.

[00:27:42] MP: Okay. I came in 1972 shortly after the earth crew. The program I entered in was something called the career training program. And it was an elite program the agency had. There were two classes a year. There are about 25 of us in each class. And basically, what we did is we trained together for five or six months, and at the end of that you chose whether you wanted to go into the director of operations. These are the guys that recruits spies, run agents, and that sort of thing, or go into analysis.

And because my personality and background and bent, I opted for analysis. There's only few of us did out of that class. There was one other individual actually who opted for analysis I think you know, it's my very good friend, Deputy Director of CIA, John McLaughlin. We entered on duty at the same day and we retired one week apart. There was a big, big training program as you would expect to learn to do espionage. There was none, really, for analysis. It was more of an orientation. How processes work? Something gets out of your typewriter and out the door. And a lot of orientation going around and meeting colleagues around the agency and the community.

They were just kind of thrown off the deep end. I will tell you, Andrew, that when I got on the desk, even with my China background as a China analyst and that sort of thing, I struggled mightily for a year and a half. My first two managers were not very good teachers or mentors. Nothing against them. It just wasn't their nature or expectation even. The thought was to the

degree that there was one at the agency on training this time is analysts can do anything. Just give him a stack of documents. He reads them. He does this and that. It's a journalism approach.

And so I was smart enough to realize that I was failing. And so I began to look at analysts who were succeeding and tried to study how they were writing. What they were doing and that sort of thing. And over time, I figured it out. And two experiences came from this. One, I vowed, and I do mean vow, that if I ever became a manager, no one who ever worked for me would go through the experience that I went through. I would do everything I could to mentor, to train, to pour what I know into them. Mike Morrell is either one of the sufferers or the one with the benefactors of that.

The second thing was, I think in late 1986, I wrote up an article for the in-house CIA journal, studies in intelligence. And the title was managing and teaching new analysts. I guess, come to be regarded as a classic. So I had this interest in analytic tradecraft, developing analysts. And I'm happy to say that a lot of the people that I mentored went on to bigger and better things later on. When John McLaughlin, when he was deputy director for intelligence, he had this problem. George Tenet, who was the director said, "I want an analytic training regimen for analysts that's as good as what we're doing for operations officers." John really didn't know what to do. And I had some thoughts on this. I was running East Asian and Latin America at that time. And he called me and said, "Would you come up here and be my deputy and try and put this program together?" There were already some good work being done on it. But then I went up there and the work I did with others became the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis. And what is now the foundational training program for analysts at CIA, the career analyst program. So if I had an impact on intelligence, other than the work that we did on the issues and that sort of thing, I suspect my greatest contribution lasting contribution, would be my role in mentoring those people and building that program.

[00:31:36] A: And tell us a little bit more about how both of those came about, the career analyst program. How long is that? What does it involve?

[00:31:43] MP: Okay. For listeners who don't know Sherman Kent, for whom the school is named, is the father of modern intelligence analysis. He was a professor at Yale. Served with

the OSS in World War II. Worked at CIA for a long, long time as Director of National Intelligence Estimates. Very much respected. Would you actually like to know how Sherman Kent School got its name?

[00:32:08] A: Sure.

[00:32:09] MP: Okay. Okay. So John calls me out. And we're sitting there and he says, "Look, George wants his program? He wants his program that's – Like what we got for operations, but he wants it for analysts." I said, "Okay." And the operator programs had some pretty classy names. They're named after a classic case, there's the Helm Center and the Keith Walter Center and that sort of thing. And said, "Okay. Okay. What is George calling this thing?" "Well, he's calling it DI College." And I looked at John and I said, "DI college? You mean the DO operations has Helms and Keith Walter? And the DI has Dick?" Sometimes you've actually got to look at these acronyms. And he said, "What would you call it?" I said, "Well, I think we got to name it after Sherman Kent." So that was the origin. The family agreed.

Okay, so I think this is a spring of 2000. And training really hadn't progressed much since I entered on duty in '72. And the office of training and education actually had some pretty good elements of what that program should be. But it was not a dedicated integrated program. And I knew what I wanted in a career analyst program. I wanted it to be foundational analytical learning. But more than training about analytic methods and tradecraft. I wanted to have, and it does have, segments on mission, ethics, values, collaboration. Everything that's required to make an intelligence analysis unit work. And I wanted there to be exercises in there. Exercises that went just beyond analytic challenges, but would replicate the pressures that analysts would face over a career, the uncertainty, the second guessing, and the rest of it.

Now, I think the initial program ran about five months. And I involved some travel as well. And I will tell you, Andrew, that the line managers at first were not only skeptical. They were cool to this idea. And I can understand that, because I've been a line manager up until this point as well too. And we were terribly shorthanded. And so we're finally getting new people in the door. And their point of view was, "Oh, you're going to take this person away from you five months? What are you going to do? I need them now." And I said, "Well, look, if you give them to me for five months, I guarantee that when they get them back, they're going to be able to hit the ground

running and they're going to be able to make a meaningful contribution to your mission sooner.” Now, they still needed seasoning. First line managers had to do the mentoring and the developing. But they're going to do it for a much stronger foundation.

Now the program has evolved a lot over the last 20 years. I'm not sure what's all in it, but I still believe it's a gold standard in analytic training. And it's certainly been copied throughout the Intelligence community. I know DIA looked at it, National Counterterrorism Center. I'm proud of that. They've gone on and developed a lot of other programs. It really does give analysts I think an appreciation, not only of what they need to know in terms of techniques, but the mission, the foundations, the purpose, the dedication, and the rest of it.

[00:35:21] A: Help people that don't have any background in the IC understand a little bit more about what it takes to make a good intelligence analyst. Are they born? Are they made? Can you spot one at a distance? Can you smell one?

[00:35:38] MP: I suppose you have to start as you do with most things, whatever, with a certain aptitude. And in the case of intelligence analysis, I think this includes intellectual curiosity, very strong communication skills, and particularly the ability to see the world through the other guy's eyes. To understand a foreign culture. How they think? How they operate? How they make decisions? But there's also basic analytic tradecraft that's got to be taught in master. I mean, you have to understand the strengths and weaknesses of various collection systems, human reporting, satellite photography, intercepted communications, documents, denial and deception techniques, all the sorts of things that are treated so expertly well at the International Spy Museum.

Now, I came up with a strong foundation in Asian studies and Chinese language. And that gave me a leg up for being a China analyst. But what I quickly learned when I got on the desk is that intelligence analysis really required a layer of expertise that went two or three times deeper than that. In college, the papers that I wrote were all about institutions. Was the party, the government, military. When you got on a desk at CIA as an analyst, all of a sudden, it's mostly about people, individuals in those institutions that are making those decisions. And so you need to have a whole new level of expertise and understanding of their personal history if you're

going to make judgments about how they're going to react to certain US initiatives going forward.

I think the qualities of a good intelligence analyst, or certainly that curiosity, the ability to put pieces together, to ask the right question. But I do think you also need great flexibility. And you need a real tolerance for ambiguity. Comparisons were made by others. I've made it. John McLaughlin has made it. It's bit like putting together a jigsaw puzzle, only you don't have all the pieces, you don't have the box top. Just for fun, somebody's throwing out a bunch of other pieces that don't even belong there. So it's really a matter of building up knowledge, building up expertise.

And the other thing that's really important, I think, too, about intelligence analysis is it's not static. Not static in the sense, Andrew, that the US does something, somebody else is going to do something which is going to cause somebody else to do something. And so the answer I give you today based on where we are today maybe very different than the answer I'm going to give you two weeks or three weeks from now when other things have happened. Does that mean I'm wrong today? Not necessarily. What I'm trying to do today is give you the best answer I can to the courses that you're grappling with with the information and time available. And what I need to be able to do as an analyst is to step back and say, "Okay, where are we? Where are we going? What's changed? How does this affect where the US wants to be? And how is it likely to affect the other guy? It's a dynamic thing.

And I will tell you, as an intelligence officer, the biggest mystery that you're going to have to grapple with is what your own government is doing. Okay? Now, we're much better reading what's going on in Beijing than sometimes we are what's going on inside the West Wing. And there was no greater case of that in my career than the Nixon Overture to China and Kissinger's secret trip, which I guess maybe a couple people in CIA knew about, but nobody in the Chinese dropped it.

[00:39:13] A: If someone's out there and they want to become an intelligence analyst, I mean, other than filling out the paperwork and applying, like what advice would you give them? Like should they start boning up on intelligence analyst now? Or would you say, "No. Don't do that. Go away and read Sufi poetry or do something else."

[00:39:37] MP: Here's my bias. Okay, I came out of areas studies program, and they just don't really exist anymore. They were kind of a product of the Cold War. Because that's my experience, I believe very strongly that where you need to start with is a deep understanding of the history and the culture, the language of whatever area that you're working on. You can't understate In the Middle East unless you understand Islam, okay? And the difference between Shia and Sunni, and the history of the place, the role of the tribes and all the rest of that. You can understand China unless you understand what they've been through. Our job, I believe, as analysts, at the end of the day, comes down to helping our fellow understand how the other person sees the world. And by that, I mean, how he sees the situation. What things he thinks about US intentions and capabilities? His tolerance for risk and what constitutes an acceptable outcome in his eyes. We have to understand that we have to be able to communicate that to us policymakers, because if they don't understand it, they have no idea how their policies or actions are going to be received, or whether or not they're going to be affected. So I think you start with those kinds of things.

Now, there're a number of college programs that have come up in the last decade or so that I think have gone a long way toward trying to create an intelligence, if not degree certificate. I think that's helpful. I think that's helpful, because it helps people that are interested in intelligence understand what the life is really like. What some of the difficulties are? What the successes and failures are. But I think what you start with is a deep interest in a particular subject or area. You try and get as smart as you can on that. You continue to do that after you're at the agency, or wherever you're going. It's just like being a doctor. You graduate from med school, but new techniques and new information comes in. And I don't want to go on a guy that's going to let blood. I would like to you go to a guy that's actually going to run a real test or something. You need to do that.

And you mentioned to me at one point, and maybe I'll preempt your question or come to it before you get attention to it, looking back on your career hindsight, what advice would I give to a young Marty Petersen coming in the door?

[00:42:12] A: You stole my thunder?

[00:42:12] MP: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Just all these gray hair. I guess I would tell them, tell that young person maybe three things. One, there's something to always keep in the back of your mind. This go right to the core of the mission. The risk of being wrong is always going to be with you. And the consequences of getting it wrong only increase. So you need to be strict in your tradecraft and honest in your own assessment of your own work. That's the first thing. The second, I think the best safeguard against being wrong is to periodically ask yourself three questions. The first is, "Where am I most vulnerable to error in my analysis?" Not how confident I am. Ask any animals how confident they are? They'll tell you, "Well, I'm an expert. I've looked at stuff. Caveated my judgments." But if you ask them, "Where are we on the weakest analytic ground? Where do we need to be most cautious in the judgments that we're making?" You get a different answer. And I think the answer to that needs to be paid attention to.

The second one is a really powerful one. What am I not seeing that I should be seeing if my line of analysis is correct? The last one. This is maybe at the root of more intelligence failures than anything else. And what I would tell this young Marty Peterson is, "Look, if you ever find yourself saying or thinking, "It makes no sense for them to do that." What you've got is a pretty clear indication that you may see this situation different than you do." And what you need to do is sit back and under what circumstances might it make sense for them to do that?

The last thing I do is I say, "Look, if you're only going to read one book on intelligence analysis, I would read *Why Intelligence Fails* by Professor Robert Jarvis, who I think is at Columbia, or was. It's the best single book I've ever read on the challenges of intelligence. He looks specifically at fall of Shan of Iran and Iraq, WMDS case studies, and what can go right and what can go wrong. I have tremendous respect for the man.

[00:44:33] A: Tell us about the experience of running these major analytic units. What's that like?

[00:44:39] MP: It's all about people at the end of the day. The structure in offices, at least what I was hearing, the structure has changed. Now they've got these centers, but Office of East Asian Analysis, you would have a director or Deputy Director, then you would have divisions, generally geographic below there. So there might be a China 1, and a North Asia 1, and a Southeast Asia 1 or whatever. But then you would have smaller units that would be focused on specific issues

and/or countries. So on China, you would probably have somebody, a unit following military developments, one following economic developments, one on politics, one on international relations. If it's a real small country, Southeast Asia, you probably have a small team of analysts that are following Indonesia or the Philippines.

Okay. The key to providing a service, and that's what we do, is understanding what issues the policymaker is grappling with. And one of the things that changed in the 80s much for the better was an energetic effort on the part of the agency to put more analysts in touch with their consumers. Part of that was briefings, holding of the president's daily brief. That's the most serious senior level action. The more important ones were the working levels at state and defense and NSC, because they are the ones that are going to tee the issues up for deputies and principle committee meetings from policy was actually going to think.

The fact that we started sending people down there to meet with them, talk with them, find out what the issues were, that they were dealing with, then you come back and say, "Okay, what questions should they be asking in addition to the ones that they are asking?" And so we spent a lot of time trying to figure out what they ought to know if they're going to be grappling with this. And then you begin to do the research. Begin to think through the issues. Some of it gets done in current intelligence, which is done daily, generally. It's a fast reaction to some sort of breaking event. We did a lot of long, more thoughtful papers, things like the outlook for Deng's economic reforms, the future of us China relations, that sort of thing.

Basically, it comes down to answering four questions, I think. You're not doing analysis if you're only answering the first two. You're doing reporting. What's going on and why is it going on? That's what reporters do. Analysis gets down to answering the next two. What does it mean, and what can be done to affect the course of events? And that's where the hard thinking and the hard writing and the hard analysis.

So I would bring a new analyst on even his office director. I try to meet with all the new analysts personally one on one. And I'm talking about offices that sometimes had 300, 400 people in. And I made a habit of walking around. We're kind of scattered all over the building and between buildings and that sort of thing, because it's important to see the leader, because the analysts pay attention to what the boss pays attention to. And if you're taking Chinese language lessons

and they see me humiliated every morning by my Chinese language teacher, then they're less afraid to go take language lessons as well. If you see me walking around and talking to my Latin American analysts and asking questions, being in the receive mode, so they're educating me so I can better represent their views and understand the issue. So then they have a respect for the tradecraft and for having depth of analytic expertise. I always made a point of talking to them about what they were doing, what they were reading. I talked to them before and after each time they had a temporary duty assignment overseas or traveled or if they had a rotational assignment done to a policy shop or in another office. I always ask the same question. What did you learn? Not what did you do? You've got to take the interest in folks.

Now, did I have people that couldn't do the job? Yes. So what do you do? You start by trying to help them. Identify what the issues are. See if you can't get some training or guidance or more mentoring and that sort of thing. But some people are just not cut out to be analysts. At that point then I have a heart to heart with. Are you happy? Is this really what you want to do? I'm not sure that your future in this line of work is bright. Let me help you get someplace else where you can make a difference and where you will be happy within the building. I was very successful with that.

I had one analyst who is very, very good on technical issues, but whose writing skills were not very good in part because English was a second language, I think. After a while, we talked, and I got this individual a rotation into one of our analytic shops that does analysis of technical systems. And she hit a home run. She can look at these things. She could brief it. And she ended up being a very senior officer.

We attempt to put a lot of round pegs in square holes. And so part of being a good manager is finding the right role. I think I was pretty good at that. The other thing I did was always help somebody get to the next job or the next position, I hated to lose good people, but I never wanted to be in a position where I was standing in their way. And Matter of fact, I wanted a reputation. And I think I had it. That if you could go to work for this difficult individual. People go on and do better things and help you get there. And so I think I had a reputation as a mentor and a developer of analysts.

[00:50:43] A: One of them, it seems to me the – I mean, for any institution, but especially for intelligence analysts, you want people that are experienced in one area to stick around, because over the years, you pick up a lot of knowledge. But on the other hand, you want the institution and its culture and ideas to be oxygenated. You want some circulation of blood coming through. So how do you balance that other than like staff turnover? That seems like a difficult thing to do.

[00:51:21] MP: And frankly, most analysts after a while come and tell you, “I’m tired of working this account.” And you got to say, “Okay, what would you like to do?” One of the things that happened over the course of my career, I was very fortunate, because it was very, very rare to have an overseas assignment as an analyst. As a matter of fact, I was the first one to do that in a particular place where I was sent to work in China issues. Now it’s much more common. That was one of the things we also did with the Sherman Kent School. Part of that program was to embed more analysts in other government agencies, defense, state, treasury, to work as officers in those agencies.

When they came back, they had a broader perspective of the policy process. They understood how these people work and that sort of thing. So there was a lot of opportunities now for analysts to serve overseas. To get out of line analysis and do something else akin to it. Give them that break, and so that when they come back, they come back to the same area. I would hope they wouldn’t necessarily. Not the same account. They come back refreshed, and they come back with a perspective that they didn’t have.

I had a couple of analysts, one who’s leading expert on Japan, and that’s all this individual wanted to do his entire career. I was fine with that. Okay? There were others that wanted to move around a lot. That was okay too. Sometimes they came back to me. Often they did not. Sometimes they went up and did staff positions in the editorial process within the director, or went into public affairs, or to the IG staff, or to congressional affairs. Someone over in operations. So you bring in new people. You maintain the core, a core, not necessarily the core, but a core, and you bring in new people. When they decide they need to do something else, you help them do that, because the last thing you want is a disgruntled employee sitting there bitching about working on Burma for 15 years or something. And I mean, and there’s people that are really passionate about Burma, which is a fascinating place. And certainly when

counterterrorism opened up as it did after 9/11 and that sort of thing, they created a lot of opportunities for analysts to work geographic areas, but from a very different perspective and have different kind of experience, much tighter with operations.

[00:53:42] TW: One of my favorite books, *The Mask of Command* by John Keegan, he talks about the rating of US Grant and how it was so – It was very difficult not to understand what Grant wanted you to understand just by the way that he wrote. So is there are a particular style of writing? How much diversity is encouraged? Do we sometimes want someone that's going to carry you along with similes and metaphors, or should that all just be to coin scientific kind of dry writing? Help us understand that

[00:54:19] MP: Well, there're different formats. Okay? So there's something called current intelligence, president's daily brief. These are very short. Generally one page, sometimes a half a page, three-quarters of a page, because these people are extremely busy, and they're not going to have time to push through five or six pages. We had one very, very senior secretary and administration I won't mention, that when we had the longer articles on the back of the PDB, if they went over two pages, he wouldn't – He'd stop reading. This isn't for me. I haven't got time to digest this. You got to get this down to something that I can really use.

And I think analysts have to understand that the most precious commodity in Washington, D.C. is not secrets or information. Everybody's got that. It's time. It's time. The future work in D.C., longest is four years, and every day, it's a day short. And these people work tremendous hours, 18 or better hours, seven days a week. Then you've got the longer papers. And the longer papers are basically I think for us. They capture institutional knowledge. They help us probe things, lay out what we know and what we don't know. But I think the most useful thing or either answers to questions that we get from PDB readers or senior policymakers that we turn around in 24 hours. And basically they ask a specific question, and you answered that question.

So the art form, if you will, is bottom line up front. Here's the one thing you need to take away from this piece even if you don't read anything other than the first paragraph, which better not be more than two sentences. From there, you begin to provide the background and the details. So they have a deeper understanding of the takeaway point. It's very much sentence-bullet, bullet-sentence, bullet-bullet. And if you've got a briefer there delivering it, then that individual is

there to take follow up questions, but also provide details. And when I was doing briefings for wish 43 in a transition period in Texas, I would go into our secure facility in Austin about 3:30 in the morning and begin prepping for an eight o'clock briefing. I would go through everything that came in from headquarters. So I'd have the President's daily brief for that day that was going to Clinton. I would have a lot of intelligence traffic that I would then go through with an idea of what would be of interest to a president elect, and put together supplementary materials for them. And then I would go in, and I would tee up the briefing. And I would give him the book. And I would say, "Mr. President Elect, first piece is on China, or Iran, or this is a European reaction to your election." And he would look at it. He might ask me a couple of questions. I said, "Well, I got a couple other things here if you'd like to see these. I have some intelligence reporting." He said, "Yeah, leave that, or don't leave that." And so you're there to kind of fill in the gaps. But the writing has to be incredibly crisp, incredibly short. They just don't have the time. And this is true for all presidents.

Now, every president has a different style. When I came in, it was Nixon. And the President's daily brief was legal size paper. And it was stapled at the top, because he was a lawyer, and that's the way he was used to getting his information. For a while there, under Colby, we actually produced something that looked like a newspaper. Because the clients downtown were used to reading the Wall Street Journal, and they had the little things down to the side, somewhere. The articles on the inside, and that sort of thing. We've had periodic intelligence, periodicals that dealt strictly with economic issues. The Clinton Administration, that was very big. PDBs sometimes had something called snowflakes, which were basically just information items that summed up in a sentence with some world leader was doing. Okay? So the Prime Minister, whatever, is going to face a confidence call this week, such-such a date. The idea being that when the President's national security advisor might want to make a call or something, depending on how it goes, whatever they need to do with it. And then they were there kind of the current intelligence things and there was generally something in the back of the book that ran over a page that looked at an issue more deeply. Page and half, two pages.

[00:59:16] A: You mentioned the PDB there and speaking to the president or president elect. I mean, this is something that most of us only ever see in the movies or on TV. What's it like to be the person that's standing there delivering the information?

[00:59:30] MP: Well, nervous at first. But I had the great fortune, the great honor of sitting one-on-one with four different presidents. Jimmy Carter, Bush 41, Clinton, Bush 43. I retired in 2005. What I found in every case is they are very nice gentlemen, okay? People below them tend to be kind of angry and territorial. But the guy at the top, in my experience, has been very accommodating. I met Jimmy Carter after he lost the election. He was going to have a trip to China and Russia. And being a former president, they have access to intelligence, and you wanted intelligence briefing on China and Russia before he went, because I was heading to China at that time. I and my Russian counterpart flew into Atlanta, Georgia, gotten a car, drove the planes which is to hell and gone from anywhere. The instructions were pretty simple. You stopped at the secret service post. That's the first house on the left pass the only stoplight in town. So stop there. Secret service puts in the car and drive us up to the very modest corner house. Say, "What do I do?" And he says, "Well, go ring the doorbell." So trotting up, ring the doorbell. I'm expecting another secret service guy or a staff person. And who opens the door but the president, President Carter? I said, "Hello, I'm Marty Petersen. We're here to do the briefing for you." President Carter looks at me and he says, "You guys come down today?" "Yeah. Yeah." "Fly into Atlanta.?" "Yeah. Yeah." "Drive straight through here with the planes?" "Mm-hmm." "Would you like to use the bathroom?" I said, "Yes, Mr. President." He was so kind.

My father came from Denmark, immigrants from Denmark, mother from Norway. And he asked about us at the end of the things. Tell us about your history. And I said, "Well, my father's never going to believe that his son sat down with the president United States." And Jimmy Carter said, "I can fix that." And he went and got his personal stationery and wrote a note to my father all saying how much he enjoyed meeting his son that I carried back. Before we left, he showed us the work he was doing for Habitat for Humanity and the rest of it. So the private person is sometimes very different than the public person.

[01:02:00] A: And I remember reading a Robert Gates' book, *From the Shadows*. He described Jimmy Carter as – Maybe I'm misremembering this, but I'm pretty sure that he said Jimmy Carter may well be the most intelligent president we've ever had. Would you agree with that?

[01:02:19] MP: I don't know about that, because I've got a small pool. I did read Gates' book . I think he also gives Jimmy Carter great credit for putting in place the effort to contain the Soviets after Afghanistan that Reagan built upon. And I know Jimmy Carter's reputation was very weak

on foreign policy and all that. You need to read the Gates book to understand the contribution that this man actually teed-up for Reagan. If I had a favorite, it was George Herbert Walker Bush, who is the most gracious man I think I've ever met. When I did the first briefing for him, he was actually the vice president. I came back, and he asked me how it was going, and we talked about John. And about three weeks later, I get a call from the director's office, saying there's a small package up here for you. And, "Okay." So I go up and I open it up, and it's a set of vice presidential cufflinks and a tie clamp, and a personal note written by the vice president. And he did this for everybody. He was just a man who was public service. The private person is not always the same as the public person I guess.

[01:03:29] A: And I feel like I could speak to you for hours, Marty, but I am mindful of your time. And I guess one of the things that occurred to me was how do you make sure that they're not just fashioning the world in their own image in some way? Because even historians, if you need historians from 100 years ago they sound like historians from 100 years ago. And so how do assure you get the world as essentially as it's opposed through the cultural morals and biases of an analytic community?

[01:04:09] MP: That is a challenge. And I don't think we always do it very well. I have some strong views on this that I won't share about certain types of analyses that I don't think hold up very well. There is a review process. So an analyst writes something. It goes up to his supervisor. Goes through the division chief, and at one point I would look at it. When I was Associate Deputy Director for intelligence under John McLaughlin and then Winston Wiley, I was often the last set of eyes on the PDB before went it to the print shop. And I would look at it and I've started asking questions. I don't understand this. How do we get to here? And more often than not, there was there was logic to it, and the analysts could explain it, but it didn't come through in the writing. And so I'd kick it back and say, "Okay, the person who's reading this is very, very intelligent, but they're not an expert and they don't have your background. We got to make this easier to absorb."

In terms of bias, God only knows we all have it. I'm no exception. And if they were to allow me into the archives at CIA and I went back and read some of the things I wrote, I probably shutter. I think it comes down, and it's something I came on rather late in my career. The key is really understanding or developing the ability to look at the world through the other fellows' eyes. And

where we go wrong, I think more often than not, is we don't understand how the other fellow sees the world. And it's not just the political stuff. Its economic actors, its military actors, military policies, and that sort of thing.

[01:05:58] A: What's driving them?

[01:06:00] MP: Unless we have a grip on that, then we're really kind of driving blind. And one of the tragedies I think of Iraq WMD is another key point about intelligence. We asked the wrong question. A key to being a good analyst and a good manager of analysts is knowing that you're asking the right question. And if you take a look at Iraq WMD effectively, the question that they were asking in the NIE is, "What's the evidence that he's got a program for continuing development of weapons of mass destruction?" You ask that. What do you do? You go off and look for evidence that he's got a continuing program? You've got a bias in there already. If you would have asked, "How strong is the evidence that he's got a continuing program for Iraq WMD?" You come out in a different place. And if you read that full NIE, all 90 some pages of it, although heavily redacted, not the unclassified one, but the redacted. There's a lot of uncertainty in there. They were very frank about what they knew and what they didn't know and that sort of thing. Trouble is when they started boiling it down to key judgments and then a presidential summary, the natural thing happened. Judgments got firmer. All the nuances went out of the argument. And so it went from pretty complex pitcher to slam dunk.

[01:07:33] A: Was there any particular other than training a whole generation of analysts? Are there any other things that you're particularly proud of? Or were there moments that caused you particular headaches? Or other things looking back on your career that may be interesting to cast our gaze upon?

[01:07:56] MP: My work that I did, and I supervise on Asia. I'm proud of stuff. My greatest achievement, I think, is mentoring the individuals that I mentored. And I probably wouldn't have said that halfway through my career, because I didn't realize how important it was. I was doing it, but I didn't fully appreciate the significance of that. And I benefited from some great mentors myself. One was a high school English teacher that taught me how to write short, crisp sentences. Dr. Joe, that I mentioned, my professor at Arizona State, who cultivated my interest in Asia and guided me on to the East West Center. My Chinese language teacher at CIA. She

taught me more about China just through those language lessons in our conversations than I learned in any classroom ever. And I had a mentor. I was a good officer. I wasn't an intelligence officer till I worked for Tom. And Tom was quite a character. Very demanding, but very professional. I've benefited greatly, greatly from that.

If I had one problem that really bothered me and one that still kind of worries me today, Andrew, as I look at Asia and that sort of thing, it's still North Korea. I'm worried about where China's going and that sort of thing. Chinese, you can talk to and that sort of thing. The North Koreans you can talk to too, but every administration that I dealt with always, "We're going to come in with – We're going to fix the North Korea problem." So far, I guess we're six administrations or something that dealt with this thing. Were 0 for six. And I don't think Obama fixed it. Certainly, the last one didn't. I don't have much hope here too. It's just a really, really difficult problem. There was a lot of division and anger in the community over North Korean issues.

I think one of the things I'm proudest of as I look back, is it my team led the charge and finally convinced the community and the administration that North Korea was building a bomb. There were elements in the community that didn't want to believe that and took great exception to it. But telling somebody they got the bomb doesn't do anything toward helping them how to deal with it. So I guess it's a half victory at that.

[01:10:22] A: Just to finish off, where do you see intelligence analysis going? And then opening up even more, where do you see the intelligence community going or intelligence in general?

[01:10:34] MP: Okay. I retired in 2005, but I came to do some consulting open until like three years ago. So all I really have is an impression, and that's what it is. I have no data. Okay? There are two things that really concern me, leaving aside things like organization and structure and all the other. One is an old problem. And that's leaks. A core belief of mine has always been that we serve in silence. And it really bothers me when I see in press reports and that sort of thing unnamed intelligence professionals. When people agree to cooperate with US intelligence, when they agree to commit treason, and they put their lives at stake, we have a moral obligation of the deepest sort to protect them to the best of our ability.

And so, when I see things like wiki leaks and some of this other stuff where people's lives are put at risk, it's really troublesome to me. The leak problem does not seem to be getting better, and if anything, seems to be worsening. The second thing that really concerns me, and this is a product I think of a consequences particularly since 9/11. Intelligence and intelligence analysis, in particular, is much more likely these days to become the target or subject of partisan politics.

[01:12:26] A: Politicization?

[01:12:27] TW: Yeah. Not by the analysts that are doing it. But by cherry picking, or spinning or, or whatnot. And if you want a professional intelligence service, and I think the people that we serve and have served in every administration really do have great respect for the intelligence that they get. They read it. They get angry at it. They push back at it. That's good. That's good, because it tells me that what we're saying and doing has an impact. They're reading it, and we got to do a better job of convincing them that we're right. But when it becomes something to use for short term political advantage, then I think it makes it harder for that professional and ethical standard to hold in the community. Now, I am an old man. I may be overreaching here. Back in my day, when I walked barefoot through the snow to do finished intelligence, it's all different. But those two trends are something that I think need to be watched. And I hope my concerns are exaggerated, Andrew.

[01:13:42] A: Well, thanks ever so much for taking time to speak to me. Is there anything that you think is really important for listeners to hear to understand your story that we haven't touched on? I mean, I think we've done a pretty good job. Maybe there's something that you kind of thing of?

[01:14:00] MP: No. Again, I think we've covered the waterfront. I probably depleted my small jar of wisdom. Well, there's this, Memorial Day coming up. We honor our veterans. I'm one. We honor police and firefighters and first responders that put their lives at risk to protect us. But I'd ask the listeners to do is also include in that list those Americans that serve in the shadows. They're out there alone, one on one, putting their lives at risk. When I joined CIA, the Memorial Wall probably had 30 stars on it. More than 130 now. I don't know what the number is. It's a small agency. They're out. They're trying to do their best to provide the information that our

policymakers and our leaders need to keep us safe. Kind word and kind thought. Always welcome.

[01:15:04] A: Thanks ever so much, Marty. It's been great speaking to you.

[01:15:08] MP: I've enjoyed it.

[END]